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Abstrakt:  Různé  slabiny  v  softvérových  produktech  můžou  často  představovat 
značnou bezpečnostní hrozbu jestliže jsou objeveny nebezpečnými útočníky. Je proto 
důležité tyto slabiny identifikovat a ohlásit  jejich existenci zodpovědným osobám 
dřív než jsou zneužity nebezpečnými subjekty. V průběhu posledního desetiletí počet 
bezpečnostních hlášení o objevených slabinách v různých softvérových produktech 
rapidně  vzrostl.  Stává  se  stále  naročnejším  zpracovávat  všechny  tyto  hlášení 
manuálně. Tato práce rozebírá různé metody, které je možné použít pro automatizaci 
několika  důležitých  procesů  při  sbíraní  reportů  a  jejich  třídení.  Reporty  jsou 
analyzované různými způsoby, které zahrnují techniky text miningu, a výsledky této 
analýzy jsou aplikovány ve formě praktické implementace.  
Klíčová slova: informační bezpečnost, softvérová slabina, bezpečnostní hlášení, text 
mining, strojové učení
Title: Vulnerability Reports Analysis and Management
Author: Dušan Domány
Department: Department of Theoretical Computer Science and Mathematical Logic
Supervisor of the master thesis: Mgr. Daniel Toropila, KTIML MFF UK
Abstract:  Various  vulnerabilities  in  software  products  can  often  represent  a 
significant security threat if they are discovered by malicious attackers. It is therefore 
important to identify these vulnerabilities and report their  presence to responsible 
persons before  they are  exploited  by malicious  subjects.  The number of  security 
reports  about  discovered  vulnerabilities  in  various  software  products  has  grown 
rapidly over the last decade. It is becoming more and more difficult to process all of 
the incoming reports manually. This work discusses various methods that can be used 
to automate several important processes in collecting and sorting the reports. The 
reports are analyzed in various ways, including techniques of  text  mining, and the 
results of the analysis are applied in form of practical implementation.
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1  Introduction
The importance  of  information technologies  has  grown rapidly over  the  last  few 
decades.  Computers  have  become  a  common  property  of  many  families  and  an 
essential  part  of  the  industry.  In  many countries,  a  connection  to  the  Internet  is 
considered to be a matter of course.
Human society is  becoming more and more dependent on the correct and 
uninterrupted operation of increasingly complex systems. The complexity of modern 
information  and  communication  systems  and  the  related  difficulty  to  ensure  an 
adequate control over their operation creates many opportunities for targeted attacks.
In order to prevent these attacks from happening, it is necessary to identify all 
potential vulnerabilities and implement adequate measures before they are found and 
exploited by malicious attackers. Many of these vulnerabilities can occur in various 
software products. If a vulnerable software product is widely used, its vulnerability 
can  represent  a  serious  security  threat  for  many  people  and  organizations.  It  is 
therefore important that these vulnerabilities are identified as soon as possible and 
adequately reported to responsible persons.
Because of the increasing number of security reports, it is often not feasible to 
manually process all of the incoming reports and correctly evaluate their relevance to 
a particular information system.
The following work discusses and implements various methods that can be 
used  to  automatically  collect  security  reports,  analyze  them,  and  allow  efficient 
extraction of relevant information. The analysis part focuses on applying various text 
mining techniques with the goal of identifying interesting relationships among the 
collected documents, which, as we show, could help the subsequent filtering of the 
information.
After the brief introduction in the first chapter, the second chapter starts by 
describing  the  field  of  information  security  in  general  and  introducing  its  main 
aspects.  Next,  the  chapter  focuses  on  the  target  domain  of  this  thesis  which  is 
software security.  It  explains how vulnerabilities in various software products are 
discovered and adequately reported to help prevent the damage that could be caused 
by their targeted exploitation. The last part of this chapter describes several security 
standards  that  have  been  established  by  the  National  Institute  of  Standards  and 
Technology (NIST) in order to standardize the format of the security reports.
Chapter three provides an introduction to the methods of text mining, some of 
which were used in this thesis in order to perform various analyzes of the security 
reports. The chapter describes the most common text mining techniques that are used 
to transform an unstructured text into a form suitable for an automated analysis. Then 
it continues with the introduction of various text mining tasks, as well as several 
algorithms that are commonly used to fulfill those tasks.
Chapter four is the central chapter of this thesis as it describes the analysis 
that was carried out in order to identify interesting relationships among the existing 
security reports. It starts by introducing Apache Lucene and the GATE text mining 
framework, both of which were the primary tools used in this work. The chapter then 
continues with describing the first part of the analysis which was mostly done by 
human observation and study of the related security standards. 
The second part of the analysis described in the fourth chapter focuses on one 
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of the most common text mining tasks, which is the text classification. The goal of 
this  part  of  the  analysis  was  to  classify  software  security  reports  based  on  the 
common  software  weaknesses  listed  in  the  Common  Weakness  Enumeration 
standard. The text describes how various text mining methods and algorithms were 
evaluated and compared to each other in order to achieve the best possible results.
The last part of the analysis focuses on another common text mining task, 
which is the information extraction. The text describes various methods that were 
applied  in  order  to  extract  the  key  information  from security  reports,  including 
dictionary search, knowledge-based rules, and machine learning.
Chapter five describes the major steps taken in order to collect documents for 
the purposes of this thesis. The text focuses on describing some non-trivial tasks that 
were carried out to gather the documents and prepare them for automated processing. 
The second part  of the chapter introduces the Advisory Updaters tool which was 
implemented  as  a  part  of  this  work  to  simplify  the  process  of  gathering  and 
preprocessing  documents  from  various  sources.  The  tool  already  includes 
implementation of the mechanisms for collecting documents from six sources that 
are also described in this chapter.
Chapter six describes the Vulnerability Management Tool application which 
was also implemented as an integral part of this work. The application allows its user 
to display, analyze, and filter the documents collected by the Advisory Updaters tool 
using a graphical user interface. It integrates the results of the analysis described in 
chapter four and provides an implementation that can be used by an average user 
without any deeper knowledge of the underlying methods. The text includes a user 
guide together with an introduction to the technical background of the application.
The last chapter contains the final conclusions and several ideas for the future 
work.
2
2  Information Security
2.1  Overview
Security has always played an important role in people's lives. Feeling safe and being 
safe is one of the fundamental needs of human beings. If a society wants to survive 
and prosper, it needs to defend its members from the dangers that come from the 
outside and the dangers that come from the inside. Whether it comes to individuals, 
families,  companies,  or  countries,  the  lack  of  security  almost  always  leads  to 
undesired and possibly catastrophic events. Although the most critical requirement is 
to ensure that the human lives are not threatened, it is also very important to provide 
sufficient protection of property and people's interests. 
These ideas have been integrated not only to the society as a whole, but also 
to the various sectors of industry.  The necessity for security and reliability has been 
recognized by most engineering disciplines. 
In addition to lives and material property, it is also often important to protect 
intangible assets,  like information.  Being in a  possession of a  particular  piece of 
information, and being able to protect it properly, can often provide an organization 
the necessary advantage needed to improve its competitiveness. 
Nowadays, information can have a real value and can be traded just like any 
other property.  Its importance has grown even more with the advent of computer 
technology. It is the role of information security to ensure protection of information 
and its undisturbed transmission to authorized persons. 
Basic Terms
We will first introduce some basic terms to ensure proper understanding of the text 
that follows.
An  information system is a collection of hardware, software, data, people 
and procedures used to gather, transfer, store, and process information. Any part that 
is relevant from the perspective of information security is considered to be an asset. 
Any potential act or event that could interact with the assets in an undesired way is 
considered to  be  a  security  threat.  Components  that  are  designed to protect  the 
assets against the security threats are referred to as security measures.
An object is a piece of data, or other part of the information system, which 
can be read, manipulated, used, or altered. A subject is an entity (usually a person or 
a process) which can access these objects in some of the listed ways. A malicious 
subject is an entity which performs its activities within the information system in a 
way that deviates from the established rules.
A computer  virus is a malicious piece of software that can attach itself to 
other  program and  secretly  executes  when  the  host  program is  run.  It  typically 
spreads  among multiple  programs by making exact  copies of  itself  every time it 
executes. Once a virus is executing, it can perform whatever malicious activity it was 
designed for.
A worm is a program that can propagate itself over a computer network by 
sending its own copies to the other machines in the network. Once a copy arrives and 
is executed, it performs its designed activity on the target machine and continues in 
the propagation.
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Besides various computer programs, malicious subjects can be also people. 
These people typically try to take advantage of the weak spots of an information 
system to  get  possession  of  some  secret  information,  inflict  damage,  or  use  the 
information  system to  their  advantage.  These  people  are  typically  referred  to  as 
hackers.
To protect itself against these various malicious subjects and other dangers, 
an organization needs to establish a document called security policy. This document 
defines  the  competencies,  responsibilities,  rules,  and  principles  which  the 
organization and its staff should follow to achieve the necessary security objectives.
Some  of  the  typical  security  objectives  are  described  in  the  following 
sections.
Operation Reliability
The operation reliability of an information system often determines the ability of its 
users to carry out their tasks, meet their obligations to other subjects, make the right 
decisions, etc. The suspension of its operation, or other deviation from the projected 
or anticipated activity (e.g. incorrect data processing), has undoubtedly a negative 
effect on their work. The importance of the operation reliability often rapidly grows 
during emergency situations, which can be caused for example by an unexpected 
event, or a failure of a critical component.
Ensuring  a  reliable  operation  of  the  information  system  means  an 
implementation  of  measures,  which  allow  the  information  system to  provide  its 
services  to  the  users  on  time  and  of  the  required  quality,  even  in  very  unusual 
situations.
Data Protection
Every piece of data can be associated with some descriptive attributes, like accuracy, 
correctness,  completeness,  reliability,  relevance,  etc.  Violation  of  any  of  these 
attributes is called a security incident. 
Ensuring  data  protection  means  an  implementation  of  measures,  which 
prevent an unauthorized modification of attributes that are considered to be important 
by the owner of the data, or by another authorized subject.
Although the choice of the important set can be highly individual, it typically 
includes the following attributes:
• Confidentiality: Assurance  that  private  or  confidential  information  is  not 
made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals.
• Integrity: Assurance that information and programs are changed only in a 
specified and authorized manner.
• Availability: Assurance that systems work promptly and service is not denied 
to authorized users.
It is very important when formulating the requirements for data protection to 
correctly determine which data and which of their attributes must be protected. A 
commonly  overlooked  need  is  the  protection  of  meta-data,  like  user  passwords, 
encryption  keys,  etc.  Unauthorized  manipulation  of  such  data  may  result  in 
significant damage.
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Protection of Users' Interests
The  protection  of  users'  interests  mainly  involves  protecting  their  privacy  in 
connection with their  activities  and interaction with the information system. This 
includes providing:
• Anonymity: A state in which the user can make use of the functionality of 
the information system without revealing his identity to a particular group of 
subjects.
• Pseudonimity: A state in which the user can make use of the functionality of 
the information system without revealing his identity to a particular group of 
subjects,  while  the  user  is  still  accountable  for  his  actions  within  the 
information system.
• Unlinkability: A state in which the user can make use of multiple resources 
or  services  of  the  information  system  without  risking  that  someone  else 
would be able to link these activities together.
Securing an Information System
These requirements may seem to be straightforward,  but the mechanisms used to 
meet them can be rather complex and properly securing an information system can 
be a very challenging task.  It  requires knowledge,  experience and a considerable 
amount of resources. Developing reliable security measures requires consideration of 
many potential  attacks.  Having the security measures designed, it  is  necessary to 
decide how to integrate them into the architecture of a particular information system 
in both physical and logical sense. 
"The great advantage that the attacker has is that he or she need only find a single  
weakness while the designer must find and eliminate all weaknesses to achieve  
perfect security."[STAL08]
There  are  security norms,  which  can  assist  in  the  process  of  creating  the 
security  policy,  like  TCSEC,  ITSEC,  Common Criteria,  and  BS7799 [BENE07]. 
However, each information system is different and has its own risk factors. It needs 
to be considered which assets need to be protected and how. Information security 
includes  various  domains,  like  physical  security,  software  security,  cryptography, 
personal security, and many others. All of these need to be taken into account to build 
a solid protection. The next chapter introduces the target domain of this thesis, which 
is the software security.
2.2  Software Security
Software is an essential part of any computer system. It can be the operating system 
that a particular computer is running, a chat application, or just a simple editor. It is  
always  something  that  participates  on  forming  the  complex  architecture  of 
components, which allow the computer to provide the desired services.
Computer components are usually designed to perform some specific task. 
Whether it is communication via the Internet or music playing, it is something that 
has  an obvious  meaning to  the  person that  makes  some use  of  it.  However,  the 
5
behavior  of  a  particular  component  can  vary  depending  on  the  different 
circumstances. These circumstances can sometimes deviate from what is considered 
to be normal or common, and potentially trigger an unexpected behavior. This may 
result into an undesired situation, especially in case that it is deliberately induced by 
a  malicious  subject.  If  the  component  is  a  piece  of  software  and  the  situation 
represents a security threat, the software is considered to be vulnerable and its usage 
can be potentially dangerous.
Many  software  vulnerabilities  occur  as  a  consequence  of  insufficient 
checking and validation of data and error codes in programs.
"When writing a program, programmers typically focus on what is needed to solve  
whatever problem the program addresses. Hence their attention is on the steps  
needed for success and the normal flow of execution of the program rather than  
considering every potential point of failure." [STAL08]
Software Errors
An error in a program that can cause an unintended behavior is often referred to as a 
bug. Bugs are generally unpleasant, because they can interrupt the normal interaction 
between  the  user  and  the  application.  The  stability  of  the  application  is  usually 
judged by the  number  of  bugs  that  can  be  seen.  Programmers  usually  focus  on 
eliminating as many of these bugs as possible, because they influence directly the 
users' opinion about the application.
In order  to  make it  possible  to  fix  an error,  it  is  first  needed to find and 
identify it. There are various testing techniques that programmers use to accomplish 
this task, including:
• Black box testing: A form of high level functionality testing without any 
knowledge of how the application is implemented.
• White box testing: A form of testing based on an analysis of the internal 
implementation and structure of the application.
• Unit testing: A form of testing that involves creation of code-based tests for 
individual classes and methods. The tests can be rerun at any time, which 
makes it possible to identify bugs introduced by refactoring or other changes 
in the code.
• many others
In all of these cases programmers make their assumptions about the potential 
inputs to the application and the environment it executes in. The way they test the 
application reflects the way they know it is going to be used by a common user. The 
goal is to minimize the chance of an error during the standard usage. Although this 
usually ensures the proper functionality,  it  does not guarantee the security of the 
application at the same time.
"Software security differs in that the attacker chooses the probability distribution,  
targeting specific bugs that result in a failure that can be exploited by the attacker.  
These bugs may often be triggered by inputs that differ dramatically from what is  
usually expected and hence are unlikely to be identified by common testing  
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approaches. Writing secure, safe code requires attention to all aspects of how a 
program executes, the environment it executes in, and the type of data it processes." 
[STAL08]
Defensive Programming
To provide more reliable and secure applications,  programmers have developed a 
concept called  defensive programming.  It  is also sometimes referred to as  secure 
programming. 
Defensive  programming  requires  a  changed  mindset  to  traditional 
programming practices, which focus on solving a particular problem. The defensive 
programmer needs an awareness of the consequences of failure and the techniques 
used by attackers. He has to understand how failures can occur and the steps needed 
to reduce the chance of them occurring in the program. 
This  approach  certainly  requires  much  more  time,  resources  and  proper 
education. However, it can pay off in a form of a much more reliable and secure 
application.
"Unless software security is a design goal, addressed from the start of program 
development, a secure program is unlikely to result." [STAL08]
Most Common Software Vulnerabilities
This section introduces some of the most common vulnerabilities that can be found 
in software.
The Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
Buffer  overflow can  occur  when  the  size  of  the  input  provided  to  the  program 
exceeds the size of the buffer allocated to hold its content. If the size of the input is 
not checked, an attempt to store the data beyond the limits of the buffer can cause 
overwriting a part of the memory that is outside the allocated buffer. This part can 
hold other program variables or program control flow data such as return addresses 
and pointers to previous stack frames. The buffer can be located on the stack, in the 
heap, or in the data section of the process. If appropriate security measures are not 
implemented,  this  vulnerability  can  be  further  exploited  by  a  skilled  attacker  to 
execute  arbitrary  code  with  the  privileges  of  the  attacked  process.  Even  an 
unsuccessful attempt can often lead to a crash of the application.
The Injection Vulnerability
This kind of flaw occurs when program input data can accidentally or deliberately 
influence  the  execution  flow  of  the  program  itself.  One  of  the  most  common 
mechanisms by which this can occur is when the input data are passed as a parameter 
to another helper program on the system, whose output is then processed and used by 
the original program.
To deal with this kind of vulnerability, the defensive programmer needs to 
compare the input data to a pattern that describes their assumed form and reject any 
input that fails this test. 
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One of the best known variants of this vulnerability is called SQL injection, 
which  allows  the  attacker  to  supply a  specifically  crafted  SQL command  to  the 
application input to retrieve information from the underlying database.
The Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability
This kind of vulnerability concerns a case when the input provided to a program by 
one user is subsequently displayed to another user. It can be most commonly seen in 
scripted web applications. The attack involves inclusion of a script into the HTML 
content  of  the  web  page  that  is  displayed  by the  user's  browser  and  eventually 
executed. It exploits the assumption that all content from one page is equally trusted 
and is permitted to interact with other content from that page. This can be used to 
bypass security checks and gain access privileges to sensitive data.
2.3  CERT
Even with the best effort, it is almost never possible to provide a hundred percent 
security guarantee. Writing secure code requires time and human resources, which 
are not always available. The market requires that products are delivered in a timely 
fashion, while not exceeding the specified budget. It is very common that finding all 
the bugs and fixing them is simply not worth the cost, because the majority of the 
hidden  bugs  have  often lesser  significance  than  the  further  delay of  the  product 
release.  However,  even  a  single undiscovered  significant  weak  spot  creates  a 
potential for an attack that can eventually have a catastrophic impact. Table 2.1 lists 
several  historical  computer  incidents  that  were  enabled  by  various  software 
vulnerabilities.
Table 2.1: Estimated damage caused by selected computer viruses and worms. The  
table is taken from [HENL05]
Year Virus or worm Damage estimation in dollars
1999 virus Melissa 80 million
2000 virus Love Bug 10 billion
2001 worms Code Red I and II 2.6 billion
2001 virus Nimda 590 million to 2 billion
2002 worm Klez 9 billion
2003 worm Slammer 1 billion
The first  major  incident  of this  kind occurred in 1988 when the so-called 
Morris Worm hit the Internet. This led to formation of the first CERT team that was 
covered  by  the  U.S.  Government.  The  letters  in  CERT  stand  for  Computer  
Emergency Response Team. Many English speaking countries rather use the shortcut 
CSIRT -  Computer  Security  Incident  Response  Team.  As  the  importance  of 
information  security  grew,  many nations  and  organizations  established their  own 
CERT teams. However, the original CERT has still a major role and is known as 
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CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC).
Generally speaking, CERT attempts to limit the damage caused by attacks on 
vulnerable software and services by receiving, reviewing, and further propagating the 
reports  about  newly  discovered  vulnerabilities  and  threats.  The  reports  are 
propagated via various channels, such as mailing-lists, RSS feeds, and websites.
This naturally raises a question: where does the information originally come 
from? The first  possible  source  is  a  security incident  that  was  enabled  by a  yet 
unknown vulnerability. If the incident is caused by a malicious software like a worm, 
then a fast and efficient response is required to ensure that the situation is stabilized 
as soon as possible and any additional damage is prevented.
However, a preferred approach is to prevent the incident from happening at 
first place. Several companies have been established over the last few years that do 
an active research in the area of software security and try to identify vulnerabilities in 
various  software products  before  they are discovered and exploited by malicious 
subjects. Some of these companies will be described in Chapter 5.
The information can also come from individuals that call themselves ethical  
hackers. Ethical hackers have a lot in common with traditional hackers. However, the 
major difference between these two parties is that ethical hackers do not try to take 
advantage  of  the  found  vulnerabilities,  but  rather  submit  their  discoveries  to 
responsible institutions like CERT. As the importance of ethical hacking grows, so 
increases also the number of tools that the ethical hackers have at  their disposal. 
These  tools  include  program analysis  tools  like  Valgrind  [VALG11],  exploitation 
frameworks like Metasploit [META11], various fuzzers like Peach [PEAC11] and 
Hotfuzz [HOTF11], SQL injection tools like SQLMap [SQLM11], and many others.
The policy of CERT/CC is to inform the software vendor first and participate 
on fixing the error. If the vendor does not fix the error within 45 days after it was 
notified, CERT/CC informs the society about the presence of the threat by publishing 
an article that describes the vulnerability. CERT/CC usually releases the article also 
in case that the vendor manages to fix the error, and includes the information that the 
users can protect themselves by applying the patch.
Nowadays, CERT/CC is far from being the only organization that publishes 
articles about software vulnerabilities. There are other communities and companies 
that publish articles of their own, sometimes also providing some paid services. 
2.4  Security Standards
The  increasing  number  of  the  articles  has  inspired  creation  of  various  security 
standards. Some of them are described in the following subsections.
Security Content Automation Protocol
The Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) is a suite of specifications that 
standardize the format by which security information about software vulnerabilities 
is communicated. It is a multipurpose protocol that supports automated vulnerability 
checking, technical control, compliance activities, and security measurement. Goals 
for the development of SCAP include standardizing system security management and 
improving interoperability of security products.  The protocol is  developed by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
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Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
Common  Vulnerabilities  and  Exposures (CVE)  is  a  SCAP  specification  that 
represents  a  system  of  assigning  unique  identifiers  to  publicly  known  software 
vulnerabilities using a common convention. CVE provides a comprehensive list of 
known software flaws and a globally unique name to identify each vulnerability. The 
format of a CVE identifier is  CVE-YYYY-NNNN, where  YYYY is the year when the 
vulnerability was disclosed and NNNN is a sequential number. The list of software 
flaws is available as a part of the  National Vulnerability Database, which will be 
discussed  later  in  this  text.  CVE  is  used  in  conjunction  with  other  SCAP 
specifications, like CPE, CVSS, CWE, and OVAL.
Common Platform Enumeration
The  purpose  of  Common  Platform  Enumeration (CPE)  is  to  provide  consistent 
names  for  operating  systems,  hardware,  and  applications,  which  can  be  used  by 
various parties to reference the software and hardware in a unified and standard way. 
CPE also provides a dictionary that contains names for many existing products. The 
format  of  a  CPE  name  is  cpe:/{part}:{vendor}:{product}:{version}:{update}:
{edition}:{language}.  {part} determines  the  type  of  the  product.  For  example  o 
represents an operating system, a represents an application, etc. {vendor} is the name 
of the product vendor, {product} is the name of the product itself, and the other fields 
describe additional details about the product version.
Common Weakness Enumeration
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) provides a comprehensive dictionary that 
lists many general software weaknesses that are recognized by the security research 
community. The dictionary is organized in a form of taxonomy, which organizes the 
weaknesses into categories. Each category can have multiple super-categories and 
multiple sub-categories. CWE also provides various versions of the dictionary for 
development and for research purposes.
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
Common  Attack  Pattern  Enumeration  and  Classification (CAPEC)  provides  a 
dictionary of attack patterns used to exploit software vulnerabilities. Similar to CWE, 
the dictionary is also organized in a form of taxonomy, which provides a hierarchical 
classification of the attack patterns.
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is a specification for measuring 
the relative severity of software vulnerabilities. CVSS metrics are divided into three 
groups: Base metrics measure the fundamental characteristics of vulnerabilities that 
do not  change over  time or  in  different  environments,  temporal  metrics  measure 
those attributes of vulnerabilities that change over time, and environmental metrics 
measure  those  vulnerability  characteristics  that  change  among  various  user 
environments.
The purpose of performing CVSS scoring is to help organizations identify 
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those vulnerabilities that have the greatest operational impact for them. A detailed 
description of the metrics and how they are calculated can be found in [CVSS11].
The Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language
The Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language (OVAL) provides means to encode 
system details into machine-readable rules that can be used to assess the security 
state  of  the  system.  There  are  four  types  of  OVAL  Definitions:  Vulnerability 
definitions, Patch definitions, Inventory definitions, and Compliance definitions. The 
standard comes with an implementation, which allows a user to describe the details 
of his system using the rules mentioned above and have his system evaluated based 
on the definitions of known vulnerabilities. More information on the standard can be 
found in [OVAL11].
2.5  Existing Projects
The articles about software vulnerabilities certainly provide interesting material for 
further research. Proof of that is the existence of several projects which try to analyze 
the articles and come with new ideas that could help their processing. Information 
about one of these projects can be found in [WANG09].
One thing to notice about these projects is that they usually use only one or 
two  sources  of  information.  The  most  commonly  used  source  is  the  National 
Vulnerability Database, because it provides the information in a standardized and 
structured form.
Another  observation is  that  their  analysis  is  usually  based  only  on  the 
structured  meta-data  that  is included  in  the  articles.  However,  in  spite  of  being 
completely unstructured,  the description text  of  the vulnerability can be used for 
automatic processing as well, and can also provide a lot of useful information. There 
is a relatively new  research  discipline that focuses on analyzing unstructured text 
using natural language processing techniques. This discipline, commonly referred to 
as text mining, has recently grown in popularity, as the amount of unstructured data 
presented on the Internet rapidly increases. The next chapter describes basic concepts 
of text mining together with some of its important techniques.
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3  Text Mining 
"Text mining is a new and exciting area of computer science research that tries to  
solve the crisis of information overload by combining techniques from data mining,  
machine learning, natural language processing, information retrieval, and 
knowledge management." [FESA07]
Text  mining is  a  discipline  with  a  focus  on  deriving  useful  information  from 
completely unstructured or partially structured texts written in a natural language. It 
is in many ways similar to data mining. However, the major difference between these 
two disciplines is that data mining assumes that data have already been stored in a 
structured format. This assumption is true only if the structure of the data is properly 
enforced. But even relational databases with their structural design tend to store a lot 
of information in a form of unstructured text. The text is usually written by people in 
a way that is generally understandable to other people that speak the same language. 
The goal of text mining is to simulate this understanding by a machine and use its 
processing power to analyze the documents and gather interesting information. This 
raises  a  question:  what  is  interesting  information?  The  information  needs  to  be 
considered interesting by people. This makes the question even harder to answer, 
because people are typically subjective. The answer may usually depend on the target 
domain of the documents, and potentially on other factors.
Another thing that text mining needs to deal with is that natural language is 
complex and ambiguous. Same concepts can be expressed in many different ways. In 
order  to  make  it  possible  to  analyze  the  documents,  the  text  needs  to  be  first 
preprocessed and transformed into a structured format, which correctly represents the 
text content.
A lot of research has been done in the field of text mining recently and the 
results have been successfully applied in many areas like marketing, industry, and 
medicine.  The next sections introduce a general theory of text mining along with the 
main techniques behind it.    
3.1  Typical Steps of a Text Mining Process
We will start by describing some most common steps that are typically involved in a 
text mining process.
Information Gathering
This step involves understanding the target domain, identification of its key concepts, 
and general goals setting. It is important to have an idea of how the input data look 
like and what interesting information could be eventually extracted by their analysis. 
This step next involves careful consideration of information sources that sufficiently 
cover the application domain. The sources need to provide a sufficient amount of 
documents,  and  other  necessary  information.  Implementation  of  mechanisms  for 
collection of the documents from the individual sources may be often also required. 
If the documents come in different formats, like RDF, PDF, HTML, etc., they need to 
be converted into plain text form. If the information is structured or semi-structured, 
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it might be also necessary to unify the structure before further processing.
The way of storing the documents needs to be also considered. In many cases 
it is possible to simply save their contents as text files or XML files. However, for 
purposes of many tasks it might be better to save the documents in a database. There 
are many kinds of databases available and the choice of the proper one should be 
determined by the particular goals and the type of information to be stored.
More  details on information gathering can be found in Chapter 4, which is 
dedicated to this topic.
Language Processing
Common learning algorithms cannot directly process the documents in their original 
form.  The goal  of  language processing  is  to  create  a  representation  of  the  input 
documents that can be further passed as  the input to various analytical algorithms. 
The  next  subsections describe  some of  the  most  common sub-steps  of  language 
analysis. Some of them may require specialized language analyzers for the particular 
language of the target documents. The proper choice of sub-steps usually depends on 
the particular needs of the subsequent analysis.
Tokenization
This process involves splitting the text into small meaningful sequences of characters 
called  tokens.  Tokens  are  usually  words,  numbers,  punctuations,  and  various 
symbols.  For  European  languages  the  tokenization  is  normally  based  mainly  on 
separation by white-space characters. However, in case of  other languages,  such as 
Chinese or Japanese, it can be a much more complicated task.
Segmentation
Segmentation is similar to tokenization, but operates on a higher level. It splits the 
text into meaningful blocks like sentences, paragraphs, etc. The main challenge when 
identifying sentence boundaries in an English text is distinguishing between a dot 
that signals the end of a sentence and a dot that is a part of a word, like Mr., Dr., and  
so on. Tokenization and segmentation are often referred to as one process.
Part-of-Speech Tagging
Part-of-speech tagging is a process of adding so called POS tags to the words in the 
text,  based  on  the  context  in  which  they  appear.  POS  tags  divide  words  into 
categories  based on the role  they play in the sentence.  They provide information 
about the semantic content of a word. The most common POS tags are Article, Noun, 
Verb, Adjective, Preposition, Number, and Proper Noun. A detailed list of commonly 
used tags together with their customary abbreviations and descriptions can be found 
in [TAGS11].
POS tagging can be rule-based, in  which case it  is  usually relatively fast. 
However, better precision can be often achieved by using the techniques of machine 
learning. These techniques naturally require that there is a training set available. The 
best trained taggers achieve an accuracy of about 95-98%.
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Morphological Analysis
This process is sometimes considered to be a part of the part-of-speech tagging. Its 
main purpose is to identify word lemmas using the POS tags.  A word lemma is the 
cannonical form of the word. For example words think, thinks, thinking, and thought  
have the same lemma which is  the word  think. Using the lemmas instead of the 
words themselves can simplify the subsequent analysis by reducing the dimension of 
the text representation.
Document Representation
The final step of the pre-processing phase is a choice of document representation that 
best  serves  the purposes of the subsequent  analysis.  Typically the documents  are 
represented as vectors in  a  feature space. The features can be picked manually, but 
the most common approach is what is called a  bag-of-words model,  in which the 
features  are  simply  determined  by  all  the  different  words  contained  in  all  the 
documents. There are various ways how to assign weights to these features. Probably 
the simplest way is to assign 1 to the feature if the word represented by this feature is 
contained in the document and 0 otherwise. Another way is to use the frequency of 
the word in the document as the weight. A common approach is also to calculate the 




The WordFrequency is the frequency of the word in the document, N is the number of 
documents, and DocFrequency is the number of the documents that contain the word. 
The usage of the logarithm is based on the Zipf's empirical law that states 
"The most frequent word will occur approximately twice as often as the second most  
frequent word, which occurs twice as often as the fourth most frequent word, etc." 
[KROH11]
Dimension Reduction
The main issue with the bag-of-words model is that the dimension of the feature 
space  can  grow  very  large.  Additionally,  most  of  the  words  contained  in  the 
documents usually have a very little informative value from the perspective of the 
target text mining task. These words not only unnecessarily increase the dimension, 
but can also add undesired noise into the analysis. There are various methods for 
identification  and  elimination  of  these  words.  These  methods  can  be  used 
individually or in combination with each other.
• Stemming: Many  text  mining  tasks  do  not  need  to  distinguish  between 
various  forms  of  a  word,  because  the  presence  of  the  word  itself  has  a 
sufficient  informative  value.  Therefore  the  results  of  the  morphological 
analysis can be used to reduce the dimension by representing the words by 
their lemmas. 
• Removing stop words: Each language has some common words like articles, 
conjunctions,  prepositions,  etc.,  that  usually  do  not  contribute  to  the 
semantics  of  the  documents.  These  words  are  usually  referred  to  as  stop 
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words. The appropriate set of stop words may depend on the particular task. 
Removing  these  words  from  the  representation  can  also  reduce  the 
dimension.
• Using nouns: The main part of the semantics is usually carried by nouns. It is 
therefore in some cases possible to use the results of part-of-speech tagging 
and represent the documents only by the nouns they contain.
Once the proper document representation is created, it can be used as an input 
for various text mining tasks. Some of these tasks are described in the following 
sections.
3.2  Information Retrieval
Information retrieval is a process of finding documents that contain the answer to 
whatever  the  user  is  interested  in  regarding  the  target  domain.  An  efficient 
information  retrieval system needs to provide a query language that is expressive 
enough  to  sufficiently  enable  the  user  to  specify  attributes  of  documents  he  is 
interested in. The search can be performed over structured or unstructured data. In 
both cases, the data need to be properly indexed to enable quick response time. The 
retrieved  documents  are  often  ranked  and  ordered  by  the  ranking.  The  rank 
determines how relevant the documents are to the users query.  The quality of an 
information retrieval system is usually measured by two metrics:
Precision=(Number of retrieved relevant documents)
( Number of all retrieved documents)
If the precision is low, the user potentially wastes time by reviewing non-
relevant documents.
Recall=( Number of retrieved relevant documents )
(Number of possible relevant documents)
If  the  recall  is  low,  the  user  potentially  misses  important  or  interesting 
documents.
Information retrieval is not necessarily related only to text mining. However, 
there are certain text mining techniques that can help improving the search metrics. 
  
3.3  Classification
Classification is also commonly referred to as categorization. The task is to classify a 
given instance of  text  into  a  pre-specified set  of  categories.  There  are  two main 
approaches to this task:
• Knowledge  engineering: The  expert’s  knowledge  about  the  categories  is 
directly encoded into the system. The main drawback of this approach is the 
requirement  of  highly skilled experts  for  creation  and maintenance of  the 
knowledge-encoding rules. 
• Machine  learning: A  classifier  is  built  automatically  by  learning  the 
properties of categories from a set of pre-classified training documents. The 
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process requires creation of a set of manually classified training instances. 
Although this might represent a labor intensive task, it  is often much less 
complicated than the creation of the expert rules.
Formally, text classification can be defined as the task of approximating an 
unknown category assignment function F : D x C → {0, 1}, where D is the set of all 
possible documents and C is the set of predefined categories. The value of F(D, C) is 
1 if the document D belongs to the category C, and 0 otherwise. 
The  machine  learning  approach  is  in  this  case  referred  to  as  supervised 
learning, because it is guided by the set of training documents.
  
3.4  Clustering
Clustering,  on the other hand, is an unsupervised learning process which separates 
the input collection of documents into so called clusters. The task is to group the 
given unlabeled collection into meaningful clusters without any prior information. A 
cluster should contain documents  that are more similar  to  each other than to the 
documents in the other clusters.
However, an important thing to be kept in mind is that there are many ways in 
which  documents  can  be similar.  The similarity function is  usually based on the 
distance  between  the  feature  vectors  in  some  metric,  such  as Euclidean  metric, 
Chebyshev metric, and so on.
One application of  clustering is  in  the  domain of  information  retrieval.  A 
common issue of standard information retrieval systems is that the same concepts are 
often expressed by different terms in different texts. Clustering, which is based on 
overall similarity, may help improve the recall of the search by returning the whole 
cluster. The idea is based on an assumption called cluster hypothesis that states
"Relevant documents tend to be more closely related to each other  
than to non-relevant document." [KROH11]
Best precision can be achieved if the clustering is done during the search and 
directly depends on the particular user query. However, this approach can naturally 
slow down the search process.  
  
3.5  Information Extraction
Information  extraction refers to the automatic extraction of structured information 
from an unstructured text. This includes extraction of entities, their attributes, and 
relationships between them. The data can be directly presented to the user, or may be 
stored in a database and used for indexing purposes in information retrieval systems. 
Information extraction involves a lot of sub-domains, including:
• Named  entity  recognition: Identification of all mentions of proper names 
and quantities in the text. These include people names, geographic locations, 
organizations, dates, times, monetary amounts, percentages, and so on.
• Coreference resolution: Identification of identical entities in the text that are 
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represented  by  different  words.  For  example  a  car  can  be  in  the  text 
represented by the word car and later by the word it, referring to the same car.
• Relationships extraction: Identification of relationships among entities.  A 
relationship can be for example between  the entity A - a medicine, and  the 
entity B - a disease, where the medicine A cures the disease B.
• Summarization: Generation of summaries from long text documents.
Similar  to  classification,  there  are  two  major  approaches  to  information 
extraction: knowledge engineering and machine learning. More information on the 
topic can be found in [FESA07], [APIS99], [CUNN04], and [SARA08].
3.6  Evaluation of results
There are various methods that can be used for each of the described tasks. The 
effectiveness of these individual methods often depends on many factors and it is 
usually required to compare multiple methods before choosing the one that is  the 
most suitable for the particular task. In order to make the comparison possible, the 
methods need to go through an evaluation process. The purpose of this process is to 
describe the quality of the methods in numbers, so the more suitable methods can be 
clearly distinguished from the less suitable ones.
A common approach in case of the classification task is to divide a set of 
classified documents from the target domain into a training set and a testing set. The 
classifier is trained on the set of training documents and subsequently applied to the 
testing set. It is important not to use the testing set in any way during the classifier 
training.  The  classifications  done  by  the  classifier  are  then  compared  with  the 
original categories of the documents in the testing set. The numbers of correct and 
incorrect  classifications  can  be  then  used  to  calculate  various  metrics  which 
determine the quality of the classifier.
3.7  Text mining algorithms
This  section describes  some  of  the  well-known  algorithms  used  in  text  mining. 
Although they are described here from the perspective of text classification, many of 
them can be adapted for the other tasks as well.
Decision Trees
A decision tree classifier  is a tree in which the internal nodes are labeled by the 
selected features of target documents and the leaves are labeled by categories. The 
algorithm classifies  a  document  by  starting  at  the  root  of  the  tree  and  moving 
successively  downward  via  the  branches  whose  conditions  are  satisfied  by  the 
document until it reaches a leaf node. 
The tree is built recursively by picking a feature f at each step and using it to 
divide the training set.  Typical criteria when choosing the feature are information 
gain and entropy. However, the trees generated in such a way are prone to overfit the 
training  set  and  their  performance  is  usually  considered  to  be  inferior  to  other 
classifiers.  The  great  advantage  of  this  algorithm  is  that  its  basics  are  easy  to 
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understand and it is often used as a baseline for comparison with other algorithms. 
More information about the algorithm can be found in [HAKA06].
Neural networks
Neural networks are among the best known algorithms when it comes to machine 
learning. The simplest type of neural network is a perceptron, which is essentially a 
linear classifier specified by a vector  w and a number  b. Given an input document 
represented  by  a  feature  vector  x,  the  perceptron  calculates  an  output  function
f =w∗x+b , where * represents a scalar product. If the value is greater than zero, 
then  the  document  belongs  to  category  A,  otherwise  the  document  belongs  to 
category B.  If  a  misclassification  occurs,  the  parameters  w and  b are  adapted  to 
correctly split the vector space.
Nonlinear networks contain one or more hidden layers between the input and 
output layers. The adaptation of the parameters is in such case performed using the 
algorithm called back propagation. However, the experiments have shown very small 
improvement  of  nonlinear  networks  over  their  linear  counterparts  in  the  text 
classification task [FESA07].
Naive Bayes Algorithm
Naive Bayes is a probabilistic classifier based on the Bayes Theorem:
P (C∣D)= P( D∣C)∗P (C)
P (D)
The  algorithm  assigns  documents  to  categories  based  on  calculated 
probabilities. It is called naive because it assumes that a presence of a term in a 
document is  statistically independent  on the presences  of  the  other  terms  in  that 
document.  
Given  a  training  set,  it  is  not  possible  to  calculate  the  probability  that  a 
document D belongs to a category C directly. However, it is possible to calculate the 
probability  of  the  category  C and  the  probability  that  a  term  T is  present  in  a 
document which belongs to the category C.
Or in other words,  it  is not possible to calculate  P(C|D) directly,  but it  is 
possible  to calculate  P(C)  based on the number of documents  that  belong to the 
category, and P(T|C) based on the frequency of the term T in the category.
Using  the  assumption  mentioned  above,  it  is  possible  to  compute
P (D∣C)=∏ P (T i∣C ) and then use the Bayes Theorem to calculate  P(C|D).  P(D) 
may take any value other than zero because it remains the same for all the categories.
K-Nearest Neighbor
K-nearest neighbor (KNN)  does  not  build  explicit  declarative  representations  of 
categories but rather stores the representations of the training documents together 
with their category labels. Each document can be represented by a feature vector, 
which corresponds to a point in Euclidean space. It is also possible to use a different 
metric.  The  similarity  between  documents  in  this  space  is  determined  by  their 
distance.  To classify a document  D,  the algorithm checks the categories of the  k 
training documents that are the most similar to D and typically chooses the category 
that is  the  most common among the documents. The documents can be also given 
different  weights  based  on  their  distance  from  D.  The  question  remains  how to 
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choose the proper value of  k.  This is  usually done empirically.  However,  various 
experiments have shown that the best effectiveness is usually achieved by choosing a 
value between 20 and 45 [LACR96], [YANG01].
Support Vector Machine
Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier in its binary form can be considered to be a 
hyperplane in the feature space that separates the points that represent the positive 
instances of the category from the points that represent the negative instances. The 
classifying  hyperplane  is  chosen  during  training  as  the  unique  hyperplane  that 
separates the known positive instances from the known negative instances with the 
maximal margin. The margin is the distance from the hyperplane to the nearest point 
from the  positive  and  negative  sets.  It  happens  sometimes  that  the  sets  are  not 
linearly separable, in which case the original finite dimensional space needs to be 
mapped into a much higher dimensional space. The SVM hyperplane is often fully 
determined by a relatively small subset of training data, which are called support 
vectors, while the rest of the training data have no influence on the trained classifier 
at all. More information about the algorithm can be found in [CRSH00].
Hidden Markov Model
Hidden Markov model refers to a type of probabilistic model based on a sequence of 
events. The events can be for example sequential consideration of the words in a text. 
It is presumed that the individual events are parts of some larger constituents, like 
names of particular type. Whether a word is part of a name or not is a random event 
with an estimable probability. This probability can be estimated from a training set. 
It  is  also  presumed  that  there  is  an  underlying  finite  state  machine  that 
changes state with each input element. The probability of a recognized constituent is 
conditioned not only by the words seen, but also by the state that the machine is in at 
the  moment.  Constructing  an  HMM classifier  consists  of  construction  of  a  state 
model  and subsequent  examination of sufficiently large training set  to  accurately 
estimate the probabilities of the various state transitions.
More information about the algorithm can be found in [FESA07].
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4  Analysis
According  to  [QWJS09]  the  number  of  articles  about  reported  software 
vulnerabilities reaches several hundred a week. This might not seem as a very high 
number, but reading all of the articles definitely consumes a considerable amount of 
time. Additionally, the number has increased rapidly over the last several years and 
can be expected to grow further. The reason is not only the larger number of software 
products that are available, but also the increased awareness of the importance of 
software security. There are almost fifty thousand software vulnerabilities recognized 
by CVE and most of them have been discovered during the last decade. The main 
issue which comes along with the articles is that usually only some of them are truly 
relevant  for  a  certain  person  or  a  particular  information  system.  The  domain  of 
relevance  can  be  additionally  determined  by  the  profession  and  interests  of  the 
person. He can be a computer network administrator, a security researcher, or just a 
regular person interested in computer security.
The main goal of this analysis is to provide means for efficient filtering and 
information retrieval in the domain of articles about software vulnerabilities. We will 
start by introducing the Lucene library, which was used to implement some of the 
advanced search techniques, and the GATE text mining framework, which was the 
primary tool used for the advanced parts of this analysis.
4.1  Lucene
Apache Lucene is a search engine library written entirely in Java. It provides means 
to index text documents and perform search over them in many various ways. It has 
probably one of the best full-text search supports among similar open source projects 
and can also compete with many commercial ones. Lucene is distributed under the 
Apache  License,  which  makes  it  available  in  both  commercial  and  open  source 
sphere.
Many relational database engines come with some full-text search support of 
their  own. This usually includes searching by wildcards using a LIKE statement. 
However, this search usually does not use any kind of full-text index, which in many 
cases  results  into  a  full  table  scan.  Another  common  feature  is  searching  by 
keywords.
Lucene supports wildcards, keywords, and much more. It usually achieves 
very good performance thanks to special full-text indexes. But the library is not a 
database engine.  It  can  be used as  a  document oriented  storage in  case  of  some 
simple applications. However, it works probably best in combination with a fully-
featured database.
More information about Apache Lucene can be found in [LUCE11].
Lucene Search Functionality




Lucene can be configured to perform tokenization during the indexing, which splits 
the  input  text  into  words  and  other  tokens.  Besides  traditional  spaces  and  other 
white-space characters, the set of token separators also includes characters like '_', '-',  
'.',  etc.  This  makes  it  possible  to  efficiently search  for  documents  that  contain  a 
specific set of tokens.
The  engine  that  performs  the  tokenization  is  called  Lucene  analyzer.  In 
addition  to  the  traditional  Lucene  analyzer,  there  is  also  a  special  engine  called 
Snowball analyzer, which can be applied to English texts. It differs in that the tokens 
are converted into their lemmatized form before they are indexed. This can in some 
situations simplify the search, because the user does not need to worry about various 
possible word forms.
In addition to search by individual tokens, it is also possible to look for whole 
phrases. Another type of search can find documents, where one word is in proximity 
of some other word. The Lucene key words search functionality is very rich and it is 
possible  to  identify  some  aspects  of  text  mining  in  it.  There  is  for  example  a 
prototype functionality, which can be used to find documents that are similar to some 
other document. This is done by eliminating stop words and using the rest of the 
words to determine the similarity.
Fuzzy Search
The way how the fuzzy search works is that it looks for similar words rather than an 
exact match. This means that for example searching for a word vulnerable will also 
retrieve documents containing word vulnerably or mistyped words like vulnerablr. A 
threshold  needs  to  be  specified,  which  determines  the  level  of  deviation  that  is 
allowed.
The search is based on the  Levenshtein distance algorithm.  The algorithm 
calculates a distance between two strings, which is defined as the minimum number 
of operations needed to transform one string into the other. The allowed operations 
are insertion, deletion, and substitution of a single character. The calculation of the 
distance  is  an  example  of  dynamic  programming.  The  algorithm  incrementally 
calculates the distances between prefixes of the two specified strings by flood filling 
a matrix of size MxN, where M is the length of the first string and N is the length of 
the second string. More information can be found in [WILD10].
The  algorithm  has  been  successfully  applied  in  spell  checking,  speech 
recognition, DNA analysis, and other areas.
Wildcard Search
This kind of search allows searching for parts of a word by masking its characters 
using symbols '*' and '?', also known as wildcard symbols. To mask only the suffix of 
a word, it is recommended to use the prefix search, which is optimized for this task. 
The library is also capable of searching by regular expressions. However, this 
functionality needs to be used carefully because of potential slower performance.
Scoring the Results
If the number of results for a given search statement is very high, it is very likely that 
the user would only want to go through those few of them that best meet the search 
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criteria. One of the powerful features that Lucene comes with is the ability to score 
the results. The relevance score associated with a result determines how closely this 
result satisfies the search statement. The user can affect the result score by boosting 
various parts of the statement and increasing their importance this way. The scoring 
formula is rather complex, but it is basically determined by the number of found 
matching words  and the  precision  of  the  match  in  case  of  the  fuzzy search,  the 
wildcard search, and so on. It is also possible to adapt the formula itself, but this is 
only recommended to advanced users.
4.2  GATE
"GATE is an infrastructure for developing and deploying software components that  
process human language." [CUNN11] 
GATE is  open  source  free  software  developed  and  maintained  by  the  GATE 
community. The software ties together various techniques that are used as part of 
natural language processing. These include linguistic techniques, machine learning, 
and  so  on.  Several  popular  projects  from this  domain  and related  domains,  like 
LingPipe, OpenNLP, Weka, WordNet, etc., are also integrated with GATE. One of 
the challenges that GATE is trying to deal with is providing the unified environment 
for working with these various projects. The two major parts of the software are:
• The  GATE  Developer: An  IDE,  where  various  components  can  be 
configured and combined using a graphical interface.
• The GATE Embedded: A framework, which can be integrated directly into 
Java code. Everything that can be done using the GATE Developer can be 
also done using the GATE Embedded.
More information about GATE can be found in [GATE11] and in [CUNN11].
Considered Alternatives
GATE was chosen because it has been already developed over fifteen years and there 
are still many people that are actively involved in its development. It has also been 
already used in  couple  of  successful  projects  and its  mailing-list  provides  active 
support to its users. The following subsections describe some other options that were 
also considered.
Mahout
Apache Mahout is a machine learning library written in Java and implemented on top 
of  Apache Hadoop.  In  spite  of  being  relatively young,  it  already supports  many 
popular  data  mining  and  text  mining  techniques  and  algorithms.  The  library  is 
distributed  under  a  commercially  friendly  Apache  Software  license.  More 
information about the project can be found in [MAHO11].
22
Weka
Weka is also a machine learning library written in Java. It contains tools for data 
preprocessing,  classification,  regression,  clustering,  association  rules,  and 
visualization. It is distributed under the GNU General Public License. A large part of 
the Weka functionality has been already integrated with GATE. More information 
about the library can be found in [WEKA11].
Working with GATE
As mentioned above, there are two major ways how to work with GATE. It can be 
integrated  directly  into  Java  code  by  including  the  GATE  Embedded  library, 
registering  desired  plugins,  creating  appropriate  objects,  and  calling  appropriate 
methods. However, it is recommended to start by using the GATE Developer to learn 
about the main aspects and ideas that come with this software.
GATE Language Resources
GATE works primarily with plain text documents. Many other formats can be also 
imported  and converted  into  their  plain text  form.  To keep them organized,  it  is 
possible to create a so called  corpus, which is a collection of selected documents. 
The GATE documents and the GATE corpora are commonly referred to as language 
resources. 
A document can have a set of features and a list of annotations. The features 
are key-value pairs which are the attributes of the document. The annotations on the 
other hand give a specific meaning to some particular parts of the document content. 
An annotation can be over a single word, or over a sequence of words. It can also 
start  or end in  the middle of  a  word,  but  this  is  not  a  very common case.  Each 
annotation is described by a start index, an end index, a type, and a list of its features. 
Each annotation type has a name and a color which is used to display the annotations 
of this type. 
To keep the annotation types  organized,  they are put into annotation sets. 
Each annotation type can be only inside one set. The name of the set can be arbitrary,  
but there are two special annotation sets, which is good to be aware of:
• The default annotation set: This annotation set  is always present and its 
name is an empty string. 
• Original  markups: If  there  are  annotations  present  inside  the  original 
document and they can be deduced during the import, they are put into this 
annotation set. For example if the original document is an XML file, each 
XML tag is replaced by an annotation. The name of the annotation and its 
features correspond to the name and the attributes of the replaced XML tag.
The annotations can be also added to the documents manually by selecting 
parts of the text, assigning an annotation type, and adding annotation features. This 
task can be very labor intensive and usually requires a good knowledge about the 
target domain. The annotation types can be also organized in a form of ontology, 
which  besides  other  advantages,  allows  the  user  to  perform  annotating  more 




The last way how to add annotations is by automated processing. There is a large 
number of plugins that can be easily loaded into GATE. Each of the plugins provides 
a  set  of  so called  processing  resources.  Each processing  resource  is  designed to 
perform some specific  task.  For  example  tokenizer splits  the  text  into  individual 
words,  numbers,  and punctuations.  It  does this  by adding an annotation for each 
word, number,  punctuation,  and space that is present inside the text.  It  also adds 
features to the annotations that provide some additional information, such as whether 
the word starts with a capital letter. The processing resources can be organized into a 
pipeline, which can be executed over a single document or over a whole corpus.
The GATE Datastore
The documents and corpora can be stored inside a  datastore and later retrieved for 
further processing. It is possible to retrieve only a corpus and run a pipeline over it. 
The documents contained in  that  corpus are  then retrieved,  processed,  and saved 
back  to  the  datastore  one  by  one.  This  can  significantly  reduce  the  amount  of 
memory that is needed for the processing.
It is also possible to create a special type of datastore called  Lucene-based 
datastore.  This  datastore  uses  Lucene to  index the stored documents  and can be 
queried using a special syntax. 
GATE Plugins
GATE itself  is an environment designed for comfortable development.  The major 
part of its processing power is present inside its plugins. There are plenty of plugins 
that  are  directly  available  and  even  more  can  be  downloaded  from  the  GATE 
website.  Besides  containing the processing resources,  the plugins also sometimes 
provide so called visual resources. These are additional graphical components, which 
can be used by a user to perform specific tasks. 
The following is a list of the most important plugins. Most of them were used 
during the analysis described in this chapter.
ANNIE
The letters in ANNIE stand for A Nearly New Information Extraction System. It is a 
collection  of  resources  that  are  primarily  designed  for  language  processing.  The 
resources  include  the  English  tokenizer,  the  sentence  splitter,  the  part-of-speech 
tagger,  the gazetteer, the semantic tagger, and some others.
The gazetteer  is  created  from one  or  more  lists  of  words.  The lists  have 
special syntax and each of the words can be assigned to a major type and a minor 
type. The gazetteer compiles the lists into a finite state machine. Any text tokens that 
are matched by the machine are annotated with features specifying the major type 
and  the  minor  type.  The  gazetteer  can  be  additionally  configured  using  several 
options like case sensitivity, character encoding, etc. 
Although  the  traditional  gazetteer  is  usually  sufficiently  fast,  it  might  be 
sometimes more efficient to use so called hash gazetteer. This type of gazetteer uses 
hash maps rather than a finite state machine and has proven to be faster in many 
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situations.
The  semantic  tagger  is  based  on  a  special  language  called  JAPE,  which 
provides means to match and manipulate already existing annotations based on the 
specified grammar. It is also referred to as the  JAPE Transducer. The matching is 
done based on rules that are similar to regular expressions. If the text was previously 
analyzed using the part-of-speech tagger, it is for instance possible to match some 
specific noun together with its preceding adjectives to match a phrase which might 
have some specific meaning. The matched pattern can be then manipulated in various 
ways.  It  is  possible  to  add  a  new  annotation  or  add  features  to  the  matched 
annotations.  Advanced users  can  also  write  Java  code  directly  to  manipulate  the 
matched content. More examples on the usage of the JAPE grammars can be found 
later in this text.
There  are  also  several  other  plugins,  like  LingPipe  and  OpenNLP,  which 
provide a similar functionality to ANNIE. Although ANNIE usually works quite well 
on common text, it is sometimes worth consideration to use these plugins as well. 
GATE Tools
From the perspective of our analysis, probably the most interesting tool contained in 
this plugin is the GATE morphological analyzer. This processing resource identifies 
the lemma and the affix of each tokenized word present in the text. These values are 
then added as features to the token annotations. The text needs to be first processed 
using the tokenizer, the sentence splitter, and the part-of-speech tagger in order to 
make it possible to apply the GATE morphological analyzer to it.
Ontology Plugin
The  ontology plugin provides the ontology support.  An ontology can be used for 
manual annotation, but can also be integrated into the semantic tagger if the text is 
annotated  based  on  the  ontology.  The  tagger  is  then  aware  of  the  relationships 
described by the ontology, which makes it for instance possible to match all children 
of an entity.
The plugin works best in combination with the ontology tools plugin, which 
provides  various  visual  resources  for  working  with  ontologies.  These  include  an 
ontology editor and tools for comfortable ontology based annotation.
There is also a type of gazetteer called OntoGazetteer which can be provided 
an ontology and a mapping file in addition to the standard word lists. The mapping 
associates the words from the lists  with the ontology classes.  The OntoGazetteer 
assigns these classes rather than major or minor types.
Learning Plugin
This  plugin  provides  the  machine  learning  support.  It  contains  only  a  single 
processing resource called batch learning. This processing resource needs to be first 
configured using a configuration file, which describes the algorithm and the various 
aspects that are supposed to be used for the learning process. The tool can be used in 
a  learning  mode,  an  application  mode,  or  an  evaluation  mode.  There  are  five 
algorithms that are currently supported: the Naive Bayes, the K-Nearest Neighbor, the 
C4.5 decision trees, the Perceptron Algorithm with Uneven Margins, and the Support  
Vector Machine. The first three algorithms are provided by the Weka library.  The 
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implementations of the other two come from the developers of GATE. Further details 
about the configuration and the usage will be described later in this text.
4.3  Basic Analysis
We  will  start  by  looking  at  the  target  articles  from  the  human  perspective  and 
identifying their basic features. There is sometimes a lot of information that can be 
extracted simply by human observation. The first thing to notice is that the articles 
from the same source usually follow the same pattern. Many sources even provide 
the articles in a partially structured form. Each source has its own structure, but the 
information usually includes some kind of title, a release date, a description, a list of 
affected products, and a list of references to other sources. 
Filtering by Release Date
One of the ways how the articles can be filtered is by the release date. If they are 
newer, they are more likely to describe a vulnerability that has not been patched yet 
and therefore requires more attention. If a person reads the articles regularly, he is 
usually more interested in the new articles than the old ones. It is also very likely that 
the articles that describe the same vulnerability are released approximately around 
the same date, shortly after the information about the existence of the vulnerability 
was disclosed.
Filtering by Affected Products
Another way of filtering might use the affected products. This is probably one of the 
most natural ways how to identify the articles that are relevant for an administrator of 
an information system. A computer can be from the perspective of software security 
described by the operating system it is running and by a list of installed software 
products. The same counts for an information system, but in a larger scale. 
The  exploitability  of  vulnerability  can  of  course  also  rely on  some other 
aspects, like the configuration of the affected products, or the underlying hardware. 
However, ignoring such aspects usually introduces only a little risk of false positive 
results, which is in most cases negligible.
Unfortunately,  there is  one significant  complication that comes along with 
this kind of filtering. Each source has its own unique way of assigning names to 
affected software products. Since the naming does not follow any well-established 
standard, the variety in the naming can be significant. The only source that tries to 
follow the  CPE standard is  NVD. And even this  standard  opens some space  for 
variety. For example  Microsoft Windows 2000 is in the CPE database listed twice: 
once with the vendor name Microsoft, product name Windows and version 2000, and 
once with the vendor name  Microsoft and the product name Windows_2000. This 
makes it hard to predict the names that will be used as references to the affected 
software products. 
The sources usually provide some list of all the affected products listed in 
their articles. The issue with these lists is that they do not usually help to keep track 
of the new articles, because the first time when a specific product appears in the list 
is usually the time when an article about the product vulnerability is published.
A way how to approach this might be not to try to filter by the exact product 
names, but rather look for some key tokens. The order of the tokens in this case 
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usually  does  not  matter.  It  might  be  a  good  idea  to  also  make  the  search  case 
insensitive and include characters  like '_'  and '-'  into the list  of token separators. 
Allowing  some  fuzziness  can  help  dealing  with  mistypings  and  little  variations 
among terms that represent the same thing. Using wildcards can also help dealing 
with certain types of shortcuts. 
A bit more complicated are shortcuts like  IE for the  Internet Explorer. It is 
possible to make an assumption that the words that are very short might represent a 
shortcut, and use the individual letters for wildcard search. However, this approach 
can considerably increase the chance of false positive results. 
Even more complicated are shortcuts like  FF for the  Mozilla Firefox or  MS 
for  Microsoft. Dealing with all possible variations would probably require a much 
deeper analysis and could probably be a topic for a separate research.
Filtering by References
Another way of filtering could use the references to other sources. These can be used 
to  identify  related  articles,  like  for  example  the  articles  that  describe  the  same 
vulnerability. The variability of strings representing the same reference is fortunately 
much lower than the variability in case of the affected products. A common type of 
reference is a CVE number, which is an identifier of a vulnerability described by 
CVE. A little bit of variability comes along with URL references. The URLs might or 
might not contain the specification of the protocol at the beginning, and some URLs 
can  be  written  both  with  and  without  the  www.  string.  However,  this  kind  of 
variability is  much less  complex and can be usually simply dealt  with using the 
wildcards.
Filtering by Description
The  last  approach  that  we  introduce  will  be  filtering  by  the  description.  The 
description is in most cases only a plain text with no strict structure. Analyzing the 
description is very similar to analyzing blogs and mailing-lists, so the techniques that 
we apply here are applicable to them as well. 
One way how to look at the description is that it is a set of words. There is a 
good chance that if  the text describes some kind of vulnerability,  it  also contains 
some particular  words  that  represent  that  kind  of  vulnerability.  The name of  the 
affected  product  and  other  information  is  also  commonly  mentioned  in  the 
description. So the basic approach here could be again looking for the key tokens. 
The user needs to know what to look for to get the right results. Allowing some 
fuzziness and wildcards might also have a meaning here. The search could be also 
applied to the title of the article, or some other text attributes.
The next sections describe some of the ways how the description text can be 
analyzed using the text mining techniques.
4.4  Classification
One  of  the  most  common  text  mining  tasks  is  classification.  Distribution  of 
documents  into  categories  can  help  in  organizing  the  documents,  searching  for 
related documents based on the common category, and so on.
This  section  focuses  on  describing  how  the  articles  about  software 
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vulnerabilities  can  be  classified  based  on  the  Common  Weakness  Enumeration 
standard.  The goal  of this  analysis  was to identify CWE categories of individual 
documents based on their description text. This could for example allow the users 
that are interested in specific areas to filter the articles by the type of vulnerability 
that they describe.
The  CWE  standard  is  mainly  followed  by  the  National  Vulnerability 
Database. It is very rare that any other source would classify the articles based on 
this standard as well. The articles from NVD were therefore used as the training set, 
so the resulting statistical model could be applied to classify the articles from the 
other sources.
Not all  the articles from NVD contain the CWE category element.  It  was 
necessary to select those documents that  were classified,  extract  their  description 
texts, and store the descriptions together with their categories. A simple programming 
solution for this task can be found among the source codes on the enclosed CD, see 
Appendix F. The application stores the information from each document in a separate 
file in the following format:
<Text class="{CWE_category_id}">{The description text}</Text>
The application was run on 26th of May 2011 and extracted 18 723 classified 
texts from all the NVD articles that were published prior to this date. Because the 
resulting files  were in  a  simple  XML format,  they could be directly loaded into 
GATE and were automatically converted into annotated description texts. 
Classification Settings
There  are  several  machine  learning  algorithms supported  by GATE.  The  various 
algorithms can provide various results depending on their configuration and on the 
specifics  of  the  task  for  which  they  are  used.  The  goal  of  this  analysis  was  to 
compare multiple algorithms and their various configurations and choose the most 
appropriate classifier for the CWE classification task.
The  algorithms  chosen  for  this  experiment  were  the  K-Nearest  Neighbor 
(KNN), the Perceptron Algorithm with Uneven Margins (PAUM), and the Support 
Vector  Machine  (SVM).  For  each  algorithm  were  chosen  two  representative 
configurations. The KNN algorithm was configured once with k = 20 and once with 
k = 40. 
The choice  of  the  configurations  for  PAUM was inspired by the  research 
described in [LZHT02]. The negative margin and the positive margin were set in the 
first version to values -1 and 1, and in the second version to values 1 and 50. The 
learning rate was set for both versions to 0.3.
The  choice  of  parameters  for  SVM  was  inspired  by  suggestions  from 
[CUNN11]. The type of the kernel for the first version was set to linear, while the 
type  of  the kernel  for  the second version  was set  to  cubic  (polynomial  with  the 
degree set to 3). The cost associated with training errors and the margin coefficient 
were in both versions set to values 0.7 and 0.4.
Further  details  on  the  algorithms and their  configuration  can  be  found in 
[LZHT02] and [CUNN11].
The classifiers were configured to run in an evaluation mode, in which the 
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evaluation was done by randomly splitting the input documents set into a training set 
and a testing set with a splitting ratio of 4:1. The exact number of training documents 
was 14978 and the number of testing documents was 3745.
To  achieve  a  more  reliable  comparison,  the  process  was  configured  to 
perform each evaluation in three separate runs and the average values from these 
runs were taken as the results.
The comparison was afterward done using the following metrics calculated 
from  the  number  of  the  correct  classifications,  the  number  of  the  incorrect 
classifications, and the number of all testing documents:
Precision= Number of correct
Number of correct+Number of incorrect




The F-measure represents a general score used to determine the accuracy of a 
classifier. This formula expects that the precision and the recall are treated equally. 
However, if the target system required different weights to be assigned to these two 
metrics, the formula would need to be adapted to meet the requirements.
There are certainly also other metrics that could be used for the comparison, 
like the overall  evaluation duration,  the  memory requirements,  and so on.  These 
metrics, however, were not considered to be relevant for the analysis. The overall 
evaluation duration was in all cases approximately 2.5 to 4 hours.
GATE also provides a probability with every classification that represents the 
confidence with which the classification was done. The calculation of the probability 
is provided for all the supported algorithms. It is possible to specify a probability 
threshold. Any classification with a probability lower than this threshold is omitted. 
If not stated otherwise, the following experiments were done with the threshold set to 
0.5.
Basic Classification
The first  experiment used the words contained in the documents in their  original 
form. The only preprocessing that had been done was tokenization of the document 
texts using the ANNIE English tokenizer. All the configurations of the algorithms 
were done the way they were described above. Table 4.1 shows the average values 
measured for the individual algorithms during this experiment.
There are several things that we can read from the results presented in the 
table. Both PAUM and SVM showed better accuracy in this task, SVM being slightly 
better in this case. Different configurations of the algorithms had different impacts on 
the results.  It is interesting to notice that PAUM (1,50), unlike the other algorithms, 
classified  all  of  the  documents,  although some of  the  documents  were  classified 
incorrectly.  This  indicates  that  all  classifications  done  by  this  algorithm  had  a 
probability higher than 0.5.
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Table 4.1: The results measured during the evaluation of various algorithms and  
their configurations after the documents had been processed by the ANNIE English  
tokenizer.
Algorithm Correct Incorrect Precision Recall F-measure
PAUM (-1,1) 2884.00 324.67 0.8988 0.7700 0.8295
PAUM (1,50) 2945.00 800.00 0.7864 0.7864 0.7864
KNN (20) 2461.00 1269.00 0.6598 0.6571 0.6585
KNN (40) 2350.33 1377.00 0.6306 0.6276 0.6291
SVM (linear) 2953.67 356.00 0.8925 0.7887 0.8374
SVM (cubic) 3119.00 539.67 0.8525 0.8328 0.8426
The algorithm with the best F-measure was SVM(cubic). While having the 
best recall  among the algorithms, it  also showed slightly lower precision than its 
linear counterpart.
The results presented by GATE also revealed that the articles from NVD are 
classified into only nineteen categories out of the 870 categories that are recognized 
by CWE. A description of these categories can be found in Appendix A.
Stemming
The input documents were in the next experiment further processed by the ANNIE 
sentence splitter,  the ANNIE part-of-speech tagger,  and the GATE morphological 
analyzer. This time the algorithms were configured to learn from the lemmas of the 
words  with the  goal  to  reduce  the  dimension of  the  feature  space.  All  the  other 
settings  remained  unchanged.  Table  4.2  shows  the  values  measured  during  the 
evaluation.
Table 4.2: The results measured during the evaluation of various algorithms and  
their configurations after the documents had been further processed by the ANNIE  
sentence splitter,  the ANNIE part-of-speech tagger,  and the GATE morphological  
analyzer.
Algorithm Correct Incorrect Precision Recall F-measure
PAUM (-1,1) 2930.33 370.33 0.8878 0.7825 0.8318
PAUM (1,50) 2945.33 799.67 0.7865 0.7865 0.7865
KNN (20) 2665.33 1048.00 0.7178 0.7117 0.7147
KNN (40) 2634.33 1062.33 0.7126 0.7034 0.7080
SVM (linear) 2934.67 350.33 0.8934 0.7836 0.8345
SVM (cubic) 3126.00 555.00 0.8492 0.8347 0.8419
If  we  compare  the  results  with  Table  4.1,  we  can  see  that  while  the 
modification had a significantly positive effect on the KNN algorithm, it had almost 
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no  effect  on  the  other  algorithms.  Considering  the  amount  of  time  needed  for 
preprocessing of the documents, it turns out to be wiser not to perform this sub-step 
if the PAUM algorithm or the SVM algorithm is to be used for this task. However, 
we also need to take into account  that  words in many languages,  like the Czech 
language and the Slovak language, typically have more forms than English words. 
Applying stemming to texts written in these languages could give different results. 
Removing Stop Words
The goal  of  this  experiment  was to  test  the  effect  of  removing various  common 
words,  numbers,  punctuations,  and symbols  from the  set  of  tokens  used  for  the 
learning process. A list of the stop words that were used for this task can be found in 
Appendix  B.  The  standard  ANNIE gazetteer  was  configured  to  use  this  list  and 
applied to  the documents.  The gazetteer  added an annotation of type  Lookup for 
every stop word found in the documents. Figure 4.3 shows the JAPE grammar that 
was subsequently applied to filter the tokens used for machine learning, keeping only 
the words that did not belong to the set of stop words. 
Figure  4.3: The  JAPE grammar  used  to  filter  the  stop  words  out  of  the  input  












-->  { inputAS.removeAll(bindings.get("notWord")); }
Table 4.4 shows the values measured during the subsequent evaluation.
Table 4.4: The results measured during the evaluation of various algorithms and 
their configurations after removing stop words from the documents.
Algorithm Correct Incorrect Precision Recall F-measure
PAUM (-1,1) 2884.67 331.00 0.8971 0.7703 0.8288
PAUM (1,50) 2942.67 802.33 0.7858 0.7858 0.7858
KNN (20) 2596.33 1142.33 0.6945 0.6933 0.6939
KNN (40) 2579.00 1160.00 0.6898 0.6887 0.6892
SVM (linear) 2980.00 388.00 0.8848 0.7957 0.8379
SVM (cubic) 3128.67 554.33 0.8495 0.8354 0.8424
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Neither PAUM nor SVM showed any decisive improvement or degradation. 
Interesting is the little degradation of results in case of KNN. We can assume that this 
was caused by removal of some important tokens. These could be some numbers, 
symbols, or words that were incorrectly identified as stop words. This indicates that 
even some common words and non-word tokens can sometimes participate on the 
semantics of the documents. It is therefore important that the set of tokens used for 
the filtering is chosen carefully.
Reducing the Number of Categories
Considering that the CWE database lists 870 categories, it might be surprising that 
only nineteen of them are used to classify the articles from NVD. However, if the 
number was significantly higher, it would be worth consideration to reduce it and 
possibly get better classification results. The reduction could be done by merging 
various categories together. Because the CWE database is organized in a form of 
taxonomy, the categories could be replaced by their super-categories.
The categories in this experiment were replaced by six top level categories 
that cover all  the nineteen sub-categories found in articles from NVD. The CWE 
database was transformed into an OWL ontology in RDF format [OWL11] using an 
XSLT transformation that can be found among the XML related files on the enclosed 
CD under the name  CWEtoOntology.xslt. The classified NVD articles were then 
converted using a simple ontology aware JAPE grammar, which can also be found on 
the CD. The evaluation was then performed with standard settings.
However, instead of improvement, the modification resulted into significant 
degradation of the results. Analyzing the cause showed that all the articles in the 
testing set were classified with the same super-category. Further analysis showed that 
this super-category covered more than a half of all the NVD articles and was far 
superior to the other five super-categories. Assuming that this was the cause of so 
many misclassifications, optimizing the task would probably require choosing such 
super-categories that evenly cover the set of input documents. Considering the fact 
that the CWE database is organized in taxonomy and not just a simple tree structure, 
this might not be an easy task. Because the number of the categories was already 
relatively low, there was no need to continue with the experiment.
Increasing the Probability Threshold
The  goal  of  this  last  experiment  was  to  find  out  more  about  the  probability 
distribution of the correct and the incorrect classifications done by the algorithms. 
The probability threshold was this time set to 0.8. The main focus was to observe the 
effect  on  the  SVM  algorithm,  which  showed  the  best  results  during  all  the 
experiments.  Because  the  stemming  and  the  stop  words  removal  showed  no 
distinctive improvement in case of this algorithm, the evaluation was done with the 
same set of documents and the same remaining settings as in the first experiment. 
Table 4.5 shows the measured values. 
We can see that also in this case PAUM (1,50) classified all of the documents, 
meaning that all  the classifications were done with a probability higher than 0.8. 
Interestingly, the number of correct classifications was slightly increased despite the 
increased probability threshold. Because the difference is very little, we can assume 
that it was caused by the random separation of documents into a training set and a 
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testing set.
Table 4.5: The results measured during the evaluation of various algorithms and  
their configurations after increasing the probability threshold to 0.8.
Algorithm Correct Incorrect Precision Recall F-measure
PAUM (-1,1) 2662.67 184.33 0.9353 0.7110 0.8078
PAUM (1,50) 2953.00 792.00 0.7885 0.7885 0.7885
KNN (20) 2192.67 630.33 0.7767 0.5855 0.6677
KNN (40) 2082.00 740.00 0.7390 0.5560 0.6344
SVM (linear) 2532.33 105.33 0.9600 0.6762 0.7935
SVM (cubic) 2689.33 158.33 0.9444 0.7181 0.8159
In  case  of  all  the  other  algorithms  the  number  of  correct  classifications 
naturally dropped, resulting into decreased recall. It is interesting, however, that the 
precision was in all the cases increased. This change is not a matter of course. 





The left-hand site of the formula represents the precision measured with the 
probability  threshold  set  to  0.8,  and  the  right-hand  site  represents  the  precision 
measured  with  the  probability  threshold  set  to  0.5.  This  inequality  can  be  then 






If we call  the classifications done with a probability higher than 0.8  high 
classifications, and the classifications done with a probability higher than 0.5 normal  
classifications, then we can express the relation as follows 
# correct high classifications
# correct normal classifications
># incorrect highclassifications
# incorrect normal classifications
Or in other words, the correct classifications are more commonly done with a 
higher probability than the incorrect classifications. 
Conclusion
Although the description texts in articles about software vulnerabilities are usually 
relatively short, they can be used to classify the articles into CWE categories. Various 
algorithms and various configurations can give different results.  Some algorithms 
can  have  better  precision  and  some  can  have  better  recall.  The  best  achieved 
precision was 0.96 by SVM (linear),  and the best achieved recall  was 0.8354 by 
SVM  (cubic).  The  final  choice  of  the  proper  algorithm  should  depend  on  the 
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particular requirements.
It is often possible to improve the precision of the algorithms by increasing 
the probability threshold. This modification, however, usually leads to a degradation 
of recall, so it is important to choose the value for the probability threshold carefully. 
Various  language  processing  techniques  can  sometimes  also  be  helpful. 
However, they need to be first tested and correctly adapted to the particular task. 
Various  modifications  can  improve the  results  of  one  algorithm and degrade  the 
results of another algorithm at the same time. 
There was one algorithm that was showing slightly better F-measure than the 
other  algorithms  during  all  the  experiments.  Figure  4.6  shows the  results  of  the 
evaluation of this algorithm in the last experiment. The complete configuration used 
for this algorithm can be found in Appendix C.
4.5  Information Extraction
This section focuses on describing how the key information can be extracted from 
the  articles  about  software  vulnerabilities  to  simplify  their  reading  and  allow 
additional ways of filtering. To perform this task, it  is first required to determine 
what the key information is.
The description text in the articles usually follows very similar pattern. This 
pattern might not be well-defined, but there are certain types of information, which 
commonly appear in the text. These types can be put into categories and possibly 
organized into a taxonomy. This taxonomy can be later turned into an ontology by 
specifying various relations between the categories.
The following taxonomy was designed for the purposes of this experiment. It 
is inspired by various standards like OVAL, CVE, and CPE. 
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Figure 4.6: Results of the evaluation of the SVM (cubic)  
algorithm presented by GATE in the last experiment
• Vulnerability Information
◦ Vulnerability Details: Various information about the vulnerability
▪ Cause: Reason why the affected product is vulnerable. Typically this 
information describes the details of the software vulnerability itself.
▪ Complexity: This  information describes  how difficult  it  is  for  an 
attacker  to  exploit  the  vulnerability.  This  typically  includes 
distinguishing whether the vulnerability can be exploited remotely, or 
whether  the  attacker  needs  to  first  gain  access  to  the  information 
system.
▪ Impact: Various possible impacts that a successful exploitation of 
the vulnerability can generally have on an information system.
▪ Type  of  Weakness: This  information  is  related  to  CWE  and 
describes the category of the weakness.
▪ Description: Any other key information about the vulnerability, like 
file names, network ports, names of vulnerable services, and so on.
◦ Affected Product: Details about the affected products.
▪ Vendor: Name of the affected product vendor.
▪ Product: Name of the affected product itself.
▪ Version: Affected version of the product.
▪ Module: Particular affected part of the product.
▪ Platform: Target operating system (possibly other type of platform) 
of the affected product.
▪ Architecture: Target  architecture  of  the  affected  product.  This  is 
most commonly x86 or x64.
◦ Reference: Reference to additional information about the vulnerability.
▪ Web: URL of a website that contains related information.
▪ CVE: CVE  reference  to  a  CVE  article  that  contains  related 
information.
▪ Credits: Typically, the name of the person or the company that has 
discovered the vulnerability.
▪ Miscellaneous: Any  other  reference  to  a  source  of  additional 
information.
The taxonomy also includes categories of information that can be commonly 
found  among  the  article  meta-data.  However,  the  main  motivation  behind  this 
experiment was that the results could be also applied to articles that do not contain 
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this type of meta-data, like the articles coming from mailing-lists and blogs.
Dictionary Search
It is not uncommon to find terms in various articles that refer to the same named 
entities.  These  can  be  names  of  companies,  names  of  commonly  used  products, 
various security terms, and so on. It is therefore possible to build a dictionary of 
these terms and identify various entities within the text simply by their names.
Although this might seem to be a simple and straightforward approach, it also 
comes  with  several  complications.  First  of  all,  if  the  dictionary  is  supposed  to 
sufficiently cover the set of possible named entities, it typically needs to contain a lot 
of entries. The information needed to create such a large dictionary might not be 
available and creating it  manually can be a very labor-intensive task. Even if the 
information is available, it might very likely require some additional processing, such 
as erasing irrelevant parts of entries. Additionally, if the dictionary grows very large, 
the search process might become noticeably slow and memory-intensive.
The second complication is  that  various  named entities can be referred to 
using various names, abbreviations, and so on. For example Cross-site scripting can 
be also referred to as Cross site scripting (without the hyphen) or simply XSS. So the 
dictionary  might  need  to  contain  multiple  entries  for  the  single  entity.  Besides, 
figuring out these alternative names might also not be an easy task.
Another complication is that the search does not take into account the context 
in which an entity exists. This context can in some cases affect the meaning of a 
term, making it difficult to put it into the right category.
The  dictionary  created  for  the  purposes  of  this  thesis  contains  the  most 
common company names, names of operating systems, names of popular software 
products, and basic security and computer terms. The information was collected from 
the following websites:
1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_computer_term_etymologies  
2. http://www.sans.org/security-resources/glossary-of-terms/  
3. http://download.cnet.com/windows/most-popular/3101-20_4-0.html?  
tag=rb_content;main
4. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_operating_systems  
5. http://www.computerhope.com/support.htm  
Collected  terms  were  adequately  shortened  and  mapped  to  the  designed 
taxonomy in the following way:
1. Computer terms → Vulnerability Details
2. Security terms → Vulnerability Details
3. Names of popular software products → Affected Product – Product 
4. Names of operating systems → Affected Product – Platform
5. Names of well-known computer companies → Affected Product – Vendor
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The ontology-based gazetteer  was used to  search for the terms in various 
articles. As could be expected, only the most common terms were found this way. 
However,  although  this  result  might  seem  to  be  unsatisfying  by  itself,  it  could 
provide a base ground for application of other methods.
Knowledge-Based Rules
It is often possible to find specific common patterns in the texts that are related to the 
same  domain.  Although  discovering  these  patterns  might  be  more  difficult  than 
identifying the named entities, this method can eventually provide relatively good 
coverage, especially when appropriately combined with the dictionary search. 
Probably  the  most  significant  complication  is  that  finding  the  patterns 
requires  careful  reading  of  many  texts  from  the  target  domain.  Additionally, 
identification of many hidden domain-specific patterns might require that this task is 
performed by a person that is experienced and well educated in the domain of the 
texts. Once the patterns are identified, they need to be adequately transformed into 
proper rules.
Creating these rules in GATE is done by writing JAPE grammars. In order to 
have a sufficient base for creating the rules, it is almost necessary that the texts are 
preprocessed by various language analyzers. Having a dictionary of named entities 
available can also be very helpful. The following text describes several rules that 
were designed for pattern matching in articles about software vulnerabilities.  The 
rules  are  based  on  observations  from reading  many of  these  articles  [NVDA11, 
OVDA11, SECA11, SEFA11, SETA11, VUPA11]. The presented JAPE grammars 
make use of the ontology (taxonomy) described above. All the grammars share the 
following initial lines:
Figure 4.7: The common header for the presented JAPE grammars.
Phase: VulnerabilityIdentification
Input: Token SpaceToken Split Mention
Options: control = appelt
Template: ontology = "http://vmt.mff.cuni.cz/owlim" 
Template: ontoTemplate = "http://vmt.mff.cuni.cz/owlim#${class}"
Identifying References
CVE  numbers  as  well  as  URLs  follow  a  specific  format.  The  format  of  CVE 
numbers was described in Section 2.4. The following JAPE grammar can be used to 
recognize these formats and identify them in a text. It requires that the text has been 
processed by the ANNIE English tokenizer and the ANNIE sentence splitter.
Figure 4.8: The JAPE grammar for identifying references.
Rule:CVEidentification
({Token.string == "CVE-"}
 ({Token.kind == "number", Token.length == 4})
 {Token.string == "-"}
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 ({Token.kind == "number", Token.length == 4}) 
):cve
--> :cve.Mention = 
  { ontology = [ontology], class = [ontoTemplate class = "CVE"]}
  
Rule: URLidentification
( ( ( {Token.string =~ "http(s?)"}
      {Token.string == ":"}({Token.string == "/"})[2])
   |( {Token.string == "www"}{Token.string == "."}))
  ({!Split, !SpaceToken})+  
):url
--> :url.Mention = 
  { ontology = [ontology], class = [ontoTemplate class = "Web"]}
Identifying Details about Affected Products
Given the name of a computer company that is followed by a sequence of words that 
start with capital letters, it is very likely that these words form a name of a software 
product. Similarly, if a product name is followed by a sequence of numbers and dots, 
there is a good chance that this sequence represents the product version. The original 
named entities could be found by the dictionary search, or by other means. 
The  following  JAPE  grammar  can  be  used  to  recognize  the  described 
patterns. The text needs to be again preprocessed by the ANNIE English tokenizer 
and the ANNIE sentence splitter.
Figure 4.9: The JAPE grammar for identifying details about affected products.
Rule:ProductIdentification
Priority: 2
{Mention.class == [ontoTemplate class = "Vendor"]}
(({Token.orth == "upperInitial"}|{Token.orth == "allCaps"})+
):product
--> :product.Mention = 
  { ontology = [ontology], class = [ontoTemplate class = "Product"]}
Rule:VersionIdentification
Priority: 1
{Mention.class == [ontoTemplate class = "Product"]}
(({Token.kind == "number"}|{Token.string == "."})+
):version
--> :version.Mention = 
  { ontology = [ontology], class = [ontoTemplate class = "Version"]}
Identifying the Type of Weakness
Another  observation  was that  the  words  vulnerability,  vulnerabilities,  attack,  and 
attacks often  appear  after  a  type  of  weakness  that  is  related  to  the  vulnerability 
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described in the text. Examples of such patterns are SQL injection attack, cross-site  
scripting  vulnerability,  and  so  on.  The  JAPE  grammar  cannot  rely  on  the 
capitalization of the letters in this case. However, the sequence that determines the 
type of weakness is very likely a sequence of adjectives, nouns, and proper nouns. 
This assumption can be represented by the following JAPE grammar. It requires that 
the text is additionally processed by a POS tagger.
Figure 4.10: The JAPE grammar for identifying the type of weaknesses.
Rule:WeaknessIdentification
(({Token.category == "JJ"}|{Token.category == "NN"}
 |{Token.category == "NNP"})+
):weakness
( {Token.string == "vulnerability"}
 |{Token.string == "vulnerabilities"}
 |{Token.string == "attack"}|{Token.string == "attacks"})
--> :weakness.Mention =
  { ontology = [ontology], 
    class = [ontoTemplate class = "TypeOfWeakness"]}
Machine Learning
GATE works primarily with annotations. We used annotations that covered the whole 
texts in order to perform the classification task. A machine learning algorithm was 
then used to identify the features of these annotations.
However,  machine  learning  in  GATE  can  be  also  used  to  identify  new 
annotations. Given a set of properly annotated text documents, a machine learning 
algorithm  can  be  trained  based  on  the  characteristics  of  the  annotations  and 
subsequently used to annotate other texts. These characteristics can be determined for 
example by the tokens that are covered by the annotations, or the tokens that are in 
proximity of the annotations. The goal of this experiment was to train a statistical 
model based on these tokens using the following characteristics:
• capitalization of letters
• part-of-speech tags
• word lemmas
• token kind – number/word/punctuation/symbol
Because there was no training set available, it was necessary to create it. Part 
of the annotation process could be done automatically using the dictionary and the 
JAPE grammars described above. However, most of the annotations needed to be 
added manually. The resulting training set contained twenty annotated documents.
Because of the small number of documents, it was not possible to perform 
reliable  automated  evaluation.  The  chosen  algorithm  was  the  Support  Vector 
Machine, which showed the best results during the classification task. The complete 
configuration created for this experiment can be found in Appendix D.
The algorithm was trained on the training set  and subsequently applied to 
twenty additional documents. Reviewing the testing set showed that even with such a 
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small number of training documents, the algorithm was able to produce reasonable 
results. Figure 4.11 shows the results on one of the testing documents.
Conclusion
There are various methods which can be used to extract key information from articles 
about software vulnerabilities. Each of these methods has its own advantages and 
disadvantages. It is often possible to combine one method with another to get better 
results.
The first introduced method was dictionary search, which requires creation of 
a large dictionary of named entities. The second introduced method was creation of  
knowledge-based rules, which requires expert knowledge about the target domain. 
The last described method was based on machine learning, which requires a proper 
configuration and the presence of a training set. We could see that even a relatively 
small  training set  can be sufficient to provide reasonable results.  This set  can be 
further  expanded  by annotating  additional  documents  using  the  trained  statistical 
model, correcting the annotations, and adding the documents to the training set. Once 
the training set grows large enough, it is likely that the statistical model will be able 
to provide much more reliable results, and it could become eventually usable in real-
world applications.
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Figure 4.11: Results of extraction of key information using machine learning  
presented by GATE on one of the testing documents.
5  Information Gathering
The previous  chapter  has  described various  ways  of  how articles  about  software 
vulnerabilities can be analyzed.  The primary information source used during this 
analysis  was  the  National  Vulnerability  Database.  The  results  of  the  analysis, 
however,  can  be  also  applied  to  articles  from  many  other  sources.  There  are 
organizations that often publish articles about certain vulnerabilities few days before 
these vulnerabilities are included into the NVD database. They also usually include 
some  additional  information,  such  as  a  solution  description.  A  few  of  these 
organizations provide their articles, or some part of the information, for free.
The  articles  from  these  organizations  are  almost  always  accessible  via 
HTTP/HTTPS protocol and the number of the articles reaches sometimes a dozen per 
day.  The  following  websites  were  analyzed  and  taken  into  consideration  as  the 
potential sources of information for the purposes of this thesis: 
1) The content is downloadable in form of XML files. There are usually several new 
articles each week. 
• http://nvd.nist.gov/download.cfm
2) The content is in HTML form. The sources provide a decent average number of 






3) The content is in HTML form. Part of the information is available only for the 
subscribed customers. There is about a dozen of new articles each day.  
• http://secunia.com/advisories/historic/
• http://www.vupen.com/english/security-advisories/
4) The content is downloadable as a SQLite database. The information is frequently 
updated, but not always complete.
• http://osvdb.org/database_info
5) The content is in HTML form. The source targets only CISCO products.
• http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/
products_security_advisories_listing.html









• http://www.ca.com/us/vulnerability-management.aspx      
7)  Blogs  containing  discussions  about  various  software  vulnerabilities.  The 
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information has almost no structure.  
• http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
• http://blogs.technet.com/msrc/
8) Mailing lists. The information has almost no structure. 
• http://www.terena.org/activities/tf-csirt/mailing-list.html
• http://seclists.org/dailydave/   
5.1  Sources of Information
The  main  criteria  when  choosing  the  most  appropriate  source  were  the  average 
number  of  articles  published  per  day,  the  accessibility  of  the  articles,  and  the 
structure  level  of  the  information.  Six  sources  were  selected  after  careful 
consideration.
The National Vulnerability Database 
http://nvd.nist.gov/download.cfm
This source is commonly referred to as NVD and it was used as the primary source 
of information for the analysis part of this thesis. The database is maintained by the 
U.S. Government and is related to most of the standards described in Section 2.4. 
The information can be browsed on the NVD website, but can be also downloaded in 
form of XML files. There is a separate XML file for each year. Additionally, there is 
a single XML file containing recently published or updated articles. The information 
includes  CVE identifier,  date  when the article  was published,  last  date  when the 
article was modified, short description of the vulnerability, list of affected software 
products, list of references to other sources, CWE category identifier, and base CVSS 
metrics provided by NVD. 
The Open Source Vulnerability Database 
http://osvdb.org/database_info
This source is often referred to as OSVDB. As the title suggests, it is an open source 
database  created  and  maintained  by  a  community  of  security  researchers.  The 
database contains information about a large number of vulnerabilities including very 
old  ones.  The  information  can  be  browsed  on  the  OSVDB website,  but  is  also 
downloadable in various forms. Registered users can download it in form of CSV 
file, SQLite database, MySQL database, or XML file. Exports into these four forms 
are done regularly. The SQLite database has so far proven to be the most suitable and 
easy to use form. The website also provides functionality called OSVDB API, which 
can be used to query the database using specifically crafted URLs. The results are in 
XML form. Unfortunately, the XML form references many parts of the information, 
using  IDs,  rather  than  including the  information  directly.  This,  together  with  the 
limited number of permitted requests per day, makes the API more difficult to use.
The  information  gathered  from OSVDB includes  OSVDB identifier,  title, 
date  when  the  vulnerability  was  discovered,  date  when  the  vulnerability  was 
disclosed,  date  when  the  article  was  published,  last  date  when  the  article  was 
modified,  short  description  of  the  vulnerability,  technical  description,  solution 
description,  list  of  affected software products,  list  of references  to  other  sources, 
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Secunia is a Danish computer security company, which performs an active research 
in  the  field  of  software  security  and  provides  services  to  help  users  identify 
vulnerable software on their computers. One of its major products is called Secunia 
PSI, a small client application, which can be installed on a PC running Microsoft 
Windows. The application scans the computer for installed software, communicates 
with the Secunia server via the Internet, and provides up-to-date information about 
the security state of the computer system.
The  company  also  publishes  articles  about  the  discovered  software 
vulnerabilities on a daily basis. Part  of the information in the articles is publicly 
available. This includes Secunia identifier, title, date when the article was released, 
last date when the article was modified, criticality level of the vulnerability, list of 
possible  impacts,  short  description,  solution  description,  list  of  affected  software 
products, list of related CVE numbers, and credits.
Security Focus 
http://www.securityfocus.com/vulnerabilities
Security  Focus  is  a  community  based  website,  which  provides  very  detailed 
information  about  the  recently  discovered  software  vulnerabilities.  The  list  of 
affected  software  sometimes  contains  thousands  of  items  and  includes  all  the 
products that are affected and all their affected versions. A user can also subscribe to 
various mailing lists based on his interest. The only little flaw of the website is that, 
probably because of its popularity,  the server takes sometimes several seconds to 
respond. The content of the articles is split among five different tabs. The first one 
includes Security Focus ID (also referred to as Bugtraq ID), related CVE number, 
date when the article was published, last date when the article was modified, list of 
affected software products, and credits. The second tab contains discussion about the 
vulnerability, which usually takes form of short description. The third tab contains a 
text  describing  the  way  how  the  vulnerability  can  be  exploited.  The  fourth  tab 




Security Tracker is not as well-known as the other sources listed above, but still 
provides  a  decent  number  of  articles.  The  information  is  publicly  available  and 
includes  Security  Tracker  ID,  related  CVE  number,  date  when  the  article  was 
published,  possibly also last  date  when the article  was modified,  list  of  possible 
impacts, short description, impact description, solution description, affected product, 




Vupen is a French computer security company, which publishes software security 
articles on a daily basis. The articles used to be freely available and were used as a 
source of information for the purposes of this work. Unfortunately, the company has 
recently stopped making its articles public and is therefore no more used as a source 
in the implementation part of this thesis.
5.2  Transformation into a Common Format 
Each of the listed sources provides a slightly different kind of information. It might 
be often a good idea to transform the information into a common format, so all the 
sources can be treated the same way afterwards. The following common format was 
designed for the purposes of this thesis: 
• Information about  the  source: The  source  name,  the  original  ID of  the 
article, and the original link to the article.
• Title: If  the  source  does  not  provide  any kind  of  title,  the  first  hundred 
characters of the vulnerability description are used instead.
• Release date: To keep a complete history of articles and avoid unnecessary 
complications,  each  update  of  an  article  is  treated  individually  as  a  new 
instance. The only reliable connection between the instances is the original 
ID, which can be later used to connect them together. The release date of the 
particular instance is therefore identified by the last update date of the article.
• Risk: The risk can take one of values  Low,  Medium,  High,  Critical. If the 
source provides some kind of information about the criticality level of the 
vulnerability,  it  is  adequately  mapped  to  one  of  these  values.  If  no  such 
information is available, but the source provides base CVSS metrics, then the 
CVSS Base Score is used to determine the value of this element. Otherwise, 
this element is empty.
• Summary: The  summary  combines  various  descriptions  that  are  present 
inside the article. This does not include the solution description. 
• Solution: If  the  source  does  not  provide  any  solution  description,  this 
element is empty.
• Affected products: The affected software products are extracted as strings, 
which in most cases contain the name of the product vendor, the name of the 
product itself, and the affected version.
• References: There are two major types of references - web references and 
CVE  numbers.  They  need  to  be  sometimes  extracted  from  various 
description texts of the article.
• Credits: The element usually contains information about the person that has 
discovered the vulnerability. If the source does not provide the information, 
this element is empty.
• Base CVSS metrics: If the source does not provide any CVSS metrics, this 
element is empty.
The  XML schema  describing  the  common  format  as  well  as  the  XSLT 
transformations for the individual sources can be found on the enclosed CD.
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5.3  Methods of Gathering Information
The last four described sources provide the information only in pure HTML form, 
which  needs  to  be  preprocessed  before  it  can  be  transformed  into  the  common 
format. This process is often referred to as web scraping and its difficulty strongly 
depends on how dynamic and well-formed the input HTML is. 
An  important  thing  to  notice  is  that  a  nice  looking  web  page  does  not 
necessarily mean nicely structured or even well-formed HTML code. The appearance 
often depends more on the CSS styles than on the HTML behind it and there is a 
variety of ways how the HTML code for a page with the same appearance can be 
written. For example, if a paragraph B appears to be below a paragraph A on the web 
page, it might be situated this way in the HTML code, but it might be just as well 
inside the paragraph A. Many web browsers are even capable of interpreting broken 
or invalid HTML code.
Another important thing is that many web pages have dynamic content. The 
HTML code  is  usually  dynamically  generated  by  the  requested  server  and  its 
structure might depend on various factors. It is most commonly determined by the 
data that are currently being presented. This might lead to some unexpected results. 
For example, a presence of an HTML element might be dependent on the presence of 
some data inside the underlying database. The HTML might in some cases change 
also while the web page is being presented. This might be due to some Javascript 
functionality or a dynamic AJAX call. 
A good first step might be to take a deeper look at the website and take time 
to figure out how the content looks like in various situations. This is probably the 
most convenient way how to find out which content is and which is not interesting. 
Each website usually follows its  own pattern and some parts of it  might be non-
standard or unexpected.  An article  can be for example split  among multiple web 
pages. Sometimes this step can lead to a discovery that the interesting content is also 
available  in  a  more  structured form, like  XML. When browsing a  website  using 
Mozzila Firefox, symbol  at the right-hand site of the URL bar indicates that there 
is an RSS feed available. Other browsers usually indicate this information as well in 
their own way. The content received from an RSS feed is in XML form and might 
simplify the next steps. 
The RSS feed may of course not be related to the relevant information, or 
may contain only a part of the information. If it is related, it usually contains at least 
the  URL references  to  the  new articles.  These  references  might  be  very helpful, 
because they determine which web pages that are present on the website are relevant. 
The references might be also listed on a dedicated web page. This is also the 
case of our four targeted sources. The extraction of the references is usually a simple 
web  scraping  task  and  consists  of  extraction  of  the  relevant  HTML block  and 
retrieval of the URL references from the child "A" elements.
After downloading the web pages from the URL references, the next step is to 
extract  the  information  from  the  gathered  documents  into  a  structured  and 
meaningful form. There are both free and commercial tools, which can be configured 
to automatically perform this task. They usually transform the document into well-
formed XHTML format and present it to the user in a convenient way, so he can 
select  the interesting parts.  The simple ones usually do not  handle dynamic web 
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pages  very  well.  The  more  advanced  ones  use  various  advanced  techniques, 
including machine learning, and are usually expensive. 
With some programming skill, it is also possible to handle the task without 
using  any of  those  tools.  Using a  programming  language directly  gives  a  lot  of 
flexibility,  but  might  be also  difficult  and time consuming.  The main goal  when 
creating the following application was to provide an environment where adding a 
new web source could be done programmatically in a simple and convenient way.
5.4  The Advisory Updaters Application
Articles about software vulnerabilities are commonly referred to as advisories. This 
is  mainly in case when they also contain some kind of solution description.  The 
application is written in C# .NET and it  is designed to be usable for regular and 
automatic downloading and processing of new advisories. The six advisory sources 
described above are already integrated into the application. 
Adding  a  new  advisory  source  typically  consists  of  implementing  two 
methods  and  one  XSLT  transformation.  The  application  is  also  designed  to  be 
customizable, so for example programmers that are not familiar with writing XSLT 
can also define a specific custom method and implement the transformation using 
C#. There are also several helper classes that can be useful to a programmer when 
adding the custom code.
Generally speaking, the application allows the programmer that wants to add 
a new advisory source to focus on solving the task itself rather than dealing with 
various technical details. Before proceeding with the User Guide, we will cover the 
important parts of the application work-flow. It is not important for a typical user to 
understand all of the work-flow details, but it is useful to have the basic idea.
The Application Work-Flow
The  application  is  configured  to  store  the  update  information  inside  a  particular 
folder. The path to the folder can be changed in the configuration file. The folder 
contains sub-folders, which contain the information from the individual runs of the 
application. The names of these sub-folders have a format of a time-stamp yyyy-MM-
dd_HH-mm-ss.  Each  of  these  sub-folders  contains  an  event  log  file  called 
eventLog.txt, an error log file called errorLog.txt, and a separate source-specific 
sub-folder for each of the advisory sources.
When the application is started, it creates a new folder with the current time-
stamp,  then  looks  for  the  folder  from  the  last  run  and  copies  a  file  called 
lastUpdateInfo.xml from each of the source-specific sub-folders while creating 
the corresponding sub-folders in the new directory. The information from this file is 
used to identify which advisories need to be downloaded and to avoid processing of 
the advisories that have already been downloaded and processed during the previous 
run. If no last update folder exists, the default settings specified in the configuration 
file are used instead.
The update for each of the sources is then started in a separate thread.  Each 
of these threads performs five steps during its lifetime. The result of each step is 
passed directly to the next step as well as saved to the hard-drive under the source-
specific folder. Saving to the hard-drive is mostly done for debugging and logging 
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purposes. The five steps are:
Links Extraction
The result of this step is a list of URLs which contains links to the documents that are 
potentially new and need to be further processed. The process usually involves some 
simple web scraping, but in some cases (NVD, OSVDB) it might also just return a 
single static reference, which points to a file that contains all new advisories. The 
result is stored in a file called links.txt.
Advisory Download
The  default  implementation  of  this  step  simply  performs  a  download  from  the 
extracted URLs.  The result is stored under a folder called HtmlAdvisories.
Advisory Parsing
Customization of this step is almost always necessary because it needs to be tailored 
to  the specific  source.  The downloaded documents  need to  be processed and the 
information needs to be extracted into XML form. The result is stored in a file called 
Advisories.xml.
Advisory Transformation
The default implementation of this step transforms the extracted advisories using the 
provided  XSLT  transformation.  The  result  is  stored  in  a  file  called 
transformedAdvisories.xml.
Advisory Filtering
This final step is common for all sources and cannot be customized. It serves two 
purposes. The first is to validate that the transformed advisories are in the correct 
format. In order to test this, the advisories are validated against the XML Schema 
that describes the common advisory format. The second purpose is to eliminate the 
advisories  that  have  already  been  processed  during  the  previous  run.  The 
identification of the new advisories during the links extraction is usually done using 
the date of the latest processed advisory. The way to tell which advisories are new is 
usually to take the advisories that were published on the same date or later.  To avoid  
getting the same advisories again, their SHA-1 hash codes are stored inside the file 
lastUpdateInfo.xml, so they can be compared to the hash codes of the advisories 
processed  during  the  next  run.  The  result  of  this  step  is  the  final  result  of  the 
application run and is stored in a file called filteredAdvisories.xml.
User Guide
The application runs on Microsoft Windows and requires .NET 4.0. The machine that 
is running the application also needs to be connected to the Internet in order to make 
it possible for the application to connect to the advisory sources and download the 
data. If there is a firewall blocking the traffic, it  needs to be configured to allow 
outbound HTTP connections to the following web sites:
• nvd.nist.gov  
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• osvdb.org  
• secunia.com  
• www.securityfocus.com  
• securitytracker.com  
The  application  can  be  started  directly  using  the  executable  file 
AdvisoryUpdaters.Application.exe,  or  by  running  the  batch  file 
UpdateAdvisories.bat. The batch file starts the application as a low priority task, 
so  the  user  can  continue  using  the  machine  while  the  application  runs  in  the 
background.
The  application  configuration  is  stored  in  a  file  called 
AdvisoryUpdaters.Application.exe.config. It is recommended to take a look at 
it  before starting the application for the first time. The configuration contains the 
following application settings:
• AdvisoryUpdateDirectory: A  path  to  the  directory  where  the  update 
information is stored. The directory needs to exist. The path can be absolute, 
or relative to the root folder of the application.
• MaximumNumberOfAdvisoriesToProcess: The  maximum  number  of 
advisories  that  are  processed  during  a  single  run  per  each  source.  The 
detection whether the advisories count exceeds this limit is most commonly 
done during the links extraction. If the advisories count is too high, then only 
the links to the oldest advisories are taken, so the limit is met. 
• Settings ending with the suffix DefaultUpdateInfo: The default last update 
information for the individual sources. This is most commonly a date from 
which the update should start. The advisories that are older than this date are 
not downloaded, even if there is last update information from the previous 
run available.
• Settings  ending  with  the  suffix  LinkPrefix: Changing  these  settings  is 
usually  not  required  and  it  is  recommended  only  to  advanced  users.  A 
situation when it might make sense is for example if the user wants to get 
some older advisories from NVD. He might need in that case to change the 
value  of  NVDLinkPrefix,  so  it  points  to  the  file  that  contains  the  older 
advisories.
The Technical Background
For a  programmer that  wants  to  add a  new advisory source updater,  it  might  be 
helpful to understand some of the important technical aspects of the application.
Execution Process Locking
When  the  application  is  started,  it  creates  a  file  called  lock.txt under  the 
application  root  directory.  If  the  file  already  exists,  the  application  terminates 
immediately to prevent any issues that could be caused by running two instances of 
the application in parallel. When the application finishes, or if an error occurs during 
the execution, the file is deleted from the hard-drive.
Logging
The source-specific threads log the progress information about the five work-flow 
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steps into a single file called eventLog.txt. The access to this file is synchronized 
to prevent collisions. If an error occurs, a short description about this error is logged 
here as well.
Additionally, a detailed description about any error that has occurred is saved 
into a file called  errorLog.txt. This description includes a detailed stack-trace of 
the thrown exception, which makes it easier to track down the source of the error.
The reason behind having such a logging mechanism is that many errors can 
occur even after the application has been regularly running for some time and might 
become  especially  useful  if  the  occurred  error  is  an  occasional  event  which  is 
difficult to reproduce.  
Architecture
The architecture makes use of a concept called dependency injection [DEIN11]. An 
integration  of  this  concept  is  done  using  a  .NET library  called  Castle  Windsor  
[WIND11]. The application consists of three main projects and an additional project 
for each of the advisory sources. The three main projects are:
1. Core: This project is a class library and contains all of the interfaces, models, 
and data that are common for the whole application. All of the other projects 
reference this project to gain access to the interfaces and models. Thanks to 
dependency injection, the other projects can use the interfaces without a need 
to  have  any  knowledge  about  the  particular  implementation  behind.  The 
project also includes a static class that contains most of the constants used in 
the application.
2. Services: This project is also a class library and contains most of the common 
implementation. This includes the default implementation of the five work-
flow steps, where each step has its own class. It also includes classes which 
control the overall  update process and some helper classes,  which will  be 
described later.
3. Application: This  project  is  a  console  application  that  contains  the  Main 
function, which is executed when the application is started. The execution 
involves  process  locking,  process  initialization,  resolution  of  components, 
and spawning of the source-specific threads. The resolution of components is 
done  using  dependency injection  and  involves  creation  of  various  objects 
using appropriate interfaces and their implementations. It is therefore needed 
that this project references all the other projects including the source-specific 
ones.
Figure 5.1 shows the dependencies among the projects.
The HTML Digger Helper
This class contains several methods, which can be useful when writing the custom 
implementation.  It  is  therefore  helpful  to  be  aware  of  their  presence.  The  most 
important methods are:
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• RunDownload: The method downloads the HTML from the specified URL 
as an UTF-8 string.
• ParseElement: The  method  parses  the  provided  HTML  string  and 
transforms it into a .NET XDocument object. The XDocument can be then 
queried using various  ways provided by .NET, including XPath,  Linq to 
XML, and so on. 
• ExtractElement:  The method extracts the HTML element specified by an 
XPath  from  the  given  HTML string.  The  method  is  suitable  for  quick 
extraction  of  a  block  that  contains  the  relevant  information.  This  can 
significantly reduce the size of the HTML string, which is then subsequently 
parsed.  The  method  does  not  perform any parsing,  but  rather  treats  the 
HTML as a string. Its usage is not recommended for HTML inputs that are 
potentially broken or invalid.
The File Storage Helper
This class contains the methods used to interact with the hard-drive. This includes 
saving and retrieving the information about the last update, writing into the log files, 
saving the results of the work-flow steps, etc. Please review the implementations of 
the existing advisory source updaters to find out how to use these methods, or read 
the code documentation for the IFileStorage interface.  
Validation of the Configuration File
If the application run terminates in an unexpected way, it might leave in some cases 
the  file  lastUpdateInfo.xml in  an  inconsistent  state.  To  make  the  application 
capable  of  recovering  from  such  error  during  the  next  run,  the  file 
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Figure 5.1: The dependencies among the projects of the Advisory Updaters  
application.
lastUpdateInfo.xml is validated against an XML Schema before the information 
from the file is used. This schema can be found on the enclosed CD. If the file is not 
valid, the file from the previous run is used instead. If that file is not valid either, the 
application looks at the run before the previous run, etc., until it finds a file that is 
valid. If no such file exists, the default configuration is used instead.
The Security Focus Downloader
The download from the Security Focus is special in two ways - the content of the 
articles is split among multiple pages and the server sometimes takes longer time to 
respond. Therefore a custom implementation for the download from this source was 
required.  To  deal  with  the  second  issue,  the  download  runs  simultaneously  in 
multiple  threads using a thread pool.  This  approach has proven to be useful  and 
might be also later integrated into the default download implementation.
Adding a New Source
One of the main goals of the application is to make adding of a new source as simple 
as  possible  while  keeping  the  flexibility  that  comes  with  the  direct  usage  of  a 
programming language. The application provides a fully integrated template for the 
whole work-flow, where a lot  of functionality can be used as it  is  or adapted as 
needed.  The  programmer  is  also  encouraged  to  use  the  helper  classes  described 
above when implementing the custom methods.
Adding a new source typically involves implementing a method for extraction 
of links to relevant documents, a method for parsing the documents into XML form, 
and writing an XSLT file for transformation into the common format. Although it is 
possible to parse the documents directly into the common format and use the default 
XSLT transformation, it is recommended to first extract the information into an XML 
that reflects the nature of the document to simplify the thinking process.
Adding a new source is done programmatically, so the programmer needs to 
first acquire the application source codes. The development environment that was 
used to create the solution was Visual Studio 2010. After opening the solution, the 
programmer adds a new project under the virtual folder called AdvisorySources. The 
name  of  the  project  should  by  convention  have  the  format  AdvisoryUpdaters.
{Unique_source_identifier},  where  {Unique_source_identifier} is  a 
reasonably long string that uniquely identifies the new source. 
The next steps are as follows:
• The programmer adds project references to the new project for the following 
projects: AdvisoryUpdaters.Core, AdvisoryUpdaters.Services. 
• The  programmer  adds  classes  for  link  extraction  and  document  parsing. 
Typical  names  for  these  two  classes  are  LinkExtractor and 
AdvisoryParser.  It  is  recommended  that  the  LinkExtractor class  is 
derived  from  class  LinkExtractorDefault and  the  AdvisoryParser is 
derived  from class  AdvisoryParserDefault.  The  following  steps  require 
that the classes are derived from their default implementations.







: base(htmlDigger, fileStorage, appConfiguration)
{}
The constructors can contain additional initialization if needed.
• The  programmer  overrides  the  method  StartExtraction() in  the 
LinkExtractor class.  This  method  should  call  _fileStorage 
.LogLink(Uri) for  each  extracted  URI  link  and  call  _fileStorage 
.FlushLinks() at the end. If the method is used to identify the last update 
information  (like  for  example  the  date  of  the  last  update),  then 
_fileStorage.SaveLastUpdate(update_information) should  be  called 
to save this information. 
• The  programmer  overrides  the  method  Parse(IEnumerable 
<Tuple<FileInfo,  Uri>>  files) in  the  AdvisoryParser class.  The 
method gets a list of downloaded documents together with their original URI 
addresses  as  a  parameter.  This  method  should  call  _fileStorage 
.SaveOriginalXMLAdvisory(XElement) for each parsed document and call 
_fileStorage.FlushOriginalXMLAdvisories() at the end.
• If  the  documents  are  not  parsed  directly  into  the  common  format,  the 
programmer needs to create a folder called Data inside of the new project and 
add his XSLT transformation under this folder. He also needs to set the file to 
be copied into the Output Directory.
• The programmer can add additional classes and override additional methods, 
if that is required. It is always recommended to make the classes derive from 
their  default  implementations.  For  additional  details,  please  review  the 
implementation of the already added advisory source updaters, or read the 
code  documentation  of  the  following  interfaces:  ILinkExtractor, 
IAdvisoryDownloader, IAdvisoryParser, IAdvisoryTransformation.
• The programmer  adds a  class  under  the new project  that  is  derived from 
AdvisoryUpdaterDefault. The programmer also needs to add a constructor 













The XSLT_FILE needs to be specified if the programmer provided an XSLT 
transformation. If the programmer has added any additional classes besides 
the  LinkExtractor and  the  AdvisoryParser,  he  needs  to  replace  the 
interface names by the class names accordingly.
• As the last step, the programmer needs to enable the new source updater. He 
does  so  simply  by adding  a  project  reference  for  his  new project  to  the 
AdvisoryUpdaters.Application.  The  new  source  is  then  automatically 
included.
Additional notes:
• To  gain  access  to  the  functionality  of  the  HTML  Digger  helper,  the 
programmer can make use of the object called _htmlDigger from any part of 
his code.
• To gain access to the application configuration interface, the programmer can 
make use of the object called _appConfiguration, in which case he should 
add the respective configuration entries into the configuration file.
• The  programmer  can  use  the  method  _fileStorage. 
LogError(UpdaterException) to  log  errors  (for  example  in  a  try-catch 
block)
• The  programmer  should  call  the  method  _fileStorage.SaveLastUpdate 
(update_information) at least once inside of his code.
Parsing
Although most of the steps described above are rather simple and straightforward, 
there is one task, which is highly non-trivial. It is the parsing itself. If the information 
does not come directly in a form of XML, it needs to be somehow extracted from the 
source  documents.  The  documents  are  most  commonly  HTML  pages.  The 
programmer  can  use  the  HTML Digger  helper  and make use  of  many powerful 
features that come with Linq to XML in that case. He can also use other tools like 
Html Agility Pack or Fizzler for querying the documents. Firebug plugin for Mozilla 
Firefox can be very helpful when analyzing the target HTML structure. 
It  is  usually a  good idea to  use XPath queries  to extract  the information. 
However, the structure of the target page often varies based on the data that are being 
presented. Because of the dynamic content, it might not be possible to perform the 
querying  directly.  To deal  with  this  issue,  it  is  often  possible  to  identify unique 
invariable patterns within the HTML, like header texts or CSS class names. If used 
carefully,  these patterns  can be very helpful  for  localizing particular  information, 
which can then be extracted using the XPath.
But getting the information is not the end of the process. Various data, like for 
example dates, can be presented in various formats. It is recommended to unify these 
formats for further processing. Regular expressions can be useful in many cases for 
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data validation. They can help catching errors early enough to determine their cause. 
It is always recommended to log any potential errors. Many errors can have 
rare causes and can occur even after the application has been successfully running for 
several days. Until most of these errors are fixed, it might be necessary to regularly 
review the error logs.
Debugging
It  is very rare that a code would work as it  was intended right after  it  had been 
written. Some additional effort is usually required to find and eliminate bugs. This 
process usually involves running the application at least several times and inspecting 
the  execution  flow.  However,  in  case  of  the  Advisory Updaters  application,  this 
would  normally mean going  through the  whole  work-flow every time,  including 
more time-consuming steps such as the advisory download. To avoid this  sort  of 
delays, the programmer can change the application behavior and make it work with 
the data from the last update. This can be done in two simple steps: 
• The programmer needs to review the Main function, comment out the line 
_thisRunDirectory = myUpdateRunner.InitializeRun();
and uncomment the line
_thisRunDirectory = myUpdateRunner.ContinueLastRun();
• The programmer needs to review the UpdateAdvisories method of the class 
AdvisorySourceUpdater,  which  is  situated  under  the  project 
AdvisoryUpdaters.Services. The programmer then needs to comment out 
any  undesired  work-flow  steps.  This  usually  involves  commenting  out 
commands updater.StartExtraction(); and  updater.Download();
These two steps will cause the updater to use the information stored inside the 
last update folder instead of downloading new data every time.
Troubleshooting
The application terminates right after it has been started
In some cases, when the application is terminated in a forced way, the file lock.txt 
might remain present even if the process is not running. It is therefore recommended 
to check the existence of the file in case when the application does not even pass the 
starting phase.
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6  Vulnerability Management Tool
Chapter 4 has described various ways how the articles about software vulnerabilities 
can be analyzed, how the information from them can be extracted, and how this all 
can be used in order to allow user to search for the information he is interested in. 
The goal of the Vulnerability Management Tool project was to integrate some of 
these ideas and provide a functional and user-friendly application that could be used 
for importing, analyzing, and filtering of the advisories collected by the Advisory 
Updaters tool described in Chapter 5.
Java was chosen as the programming language to enable a simple integration 
of Lucene and GATE into the project. The application therefore requires JRE 1.6 to 
be installed on the target machine. All the other dependencies are included in the 
application and do not require any installation. The application can be simply copied 
to the hard-drive. However, it is very important that the application is started from a 
writable medium to make it possible to import new advisories, perform the analysis, 
and so on.
The distribution of the application also includes the Advisory Updaters tool. 
By default,  the  tool  is  configured  to  store  the  advisory updates  inside  the  same 
directory which the application imports the new advisories from. It  is possible to 
simply start the Advisory Updaters tool, wait until it finishes the update, start the 
Vulnerability Management Tool application, and click on the import button. The new 
advisories will be automatically identified and imported into the application. More 
information about the usage of the Advisory Updaters tool can be found in Section 
5.4.  The  following  chapter  will  guide  you  through  the  functionality  of  the 
Vulnerability Management Tool application.
6.1  User Guide
This guide focuses on the distribution of the VMT application that can be found on 
the enclosed CD. The main purpose of this distribution is to demonstrate the concepts 
described in this work. 
Both  the  VMT  application  and  the  Advisory  Updaters  tool  have  been 
developed on Windows 7 32-bit and tested also on Windows 7 64-bit. Although the 
VMT application should run on any system with JRE 1.6 installed, the compatibility 
cannot  be  guaranteed.  The  Advisory  Updaters  tool  requires  .NET 4.0  and  it  is 
recommended to be run on Windows 7.
The distribution comes with several advisories already imported and several 
additional advisories downloaded via the Advisory Updaters tool. It is possible to 
import these additional advisories when starting the VMT application for the first 
time. If the underlying operating system is compatible with the Advisory Updaters 
application and the Internet connection is available, it is also possible to download 
new advisories by executing the file UpdateAdvisories.bat. These advisories can 
be then subsequently imported into the VMT application after the download finishes.
The VMT application can be started via VMT.jar. Please start the application 
from  the  directory  where  it  is  situated  to  ensure  that  all  paths  are  recognized 
correctly. This can be done either by double-clicking the file VMT.jar or navigating 
to the application folder via command line and typing java -jar VMT.jar. Please 
55
note that it might take several seconds until the GUI window shows up due to the 
number of libraries that the application needs to load. Part of the GUI window is 
shown in Figure 6.1.
When starting  the  application  for  the  first  time,  the  user  should  draw his 
attention to the top left part of the application window. By clicking the button Import  
new  advisories, he  can  import  new  advisories  which  have  been  previously 
downloaded by the Advisory Updaters tool. In order to identify which advisories are 
new, the application stores the full time-stamp of the last advisory update inside of its 
configuration file. The date of the last advisory update is presented above the button.
During the import, the user can watch the progress on the progress-bar which 
is also situated on the top of the window. The user can continue using the application 
during this process, but it is recommended to wait until the import finishes. The label  
under the progress-bar shows additional information about the current state of the 
process. The label displays the text Advisory import successful! after the application 
has successfully imported all the new advisories.
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Figure 6.1: The left-hand side of the Main tab of the VMT application.
The user can now click on the button  Search which is  situated below the 
progress-bar. The table under the button presents the latest 25 imported advisories. 
The  advisories  are  by default  sorted  by their  release  date.  The  user  can  further 
browse the advisories using the buttons  Next  and Previous situated under the table. 
The user can additionally choose various search criteria which will be described later 
in this section. One part of the filtering mechanisms that allow him to do so can be 
found to the left of the Search button.
The table displays the title, the release date, the source name, and the CWE 
category of the presented advisories. Advisories that have just been imported have 
the  category field  empty.  In  order  to  identify their  categories,  it  is  necessary to 
analyze them. This can be done by clicking on the Analyze advisories button, which 
is situated in the top left corner of the application window, to the right of the Import  
new advisories button. The spin-box above the button can be used to set the number 
of advisories to be analyzed. An analysis of a single advisory can take a few seconds, 
so it might be sometimes wiser not to analyze all the imported advisories at once. 
The subsequent process selects the specified number of advisories from the database 
and performs their classification and extraction of the key information. The selection 
of the advisories is not ordered by any field, so it might appear to be random. During 
the analysis, the user can watch the progress on the progress-bar. When the analysis 
finishes,  the  user  can  click  on  the  Search button  again  to  see  the  results.  If  the 
advisories  he  is  interested  in  are  still  not  analyzed,  he  can  click  on the  Analyze 
advisories button  again  to  analyze  another  group  of  advisories.  Sometimes  the 
category field of an advisory remains empty although the advisory has already been 
analyzed. This means that the analysis process was not able to identify the advisory 
category with a sufficient probability. The numbers in the bottom left corner of the 
application  window display the  total  number  of  the  imported  advisories  and  the 
number of advisories that have already been analyzed.
When the user finds the advisory he is interested in, he can select it in the 
table in order to display its details on the right side of the application window. Figure 
6.2 shows an example of a possible result.
The panel in the bottom right corner of the application window displays the 
details preview of the selected advisory. The label at the top of the panel shows the 
advisory title. The labels bellow show the name of the advisory source, the advisory 
CWE category  (if it was identified),  the release date of the advisory, and  the risk  
level of the vulnerability described in the advisory.  The  risk level is  displayed in 
color based on its value.
The  text  area  below called  Summary  contains  the  description  text  of  the  
advisory. If the length of the text exceeds the size of the area, the user can scroll the 
content using the scroll bar situated on the right side. The user can also click the 
button  Details above  the  area  to  display  a  pop-up  window  which  presents  the 
description  text  in  a  more  readable  form.  Additionally,  if  the  advisory has  been 
previously analyzed, the key information contained in the text is highlighted using 
various colors. These colors are related to the ontology described in Section 4.5 and 
will be described later in this chapter. An example of the pop-up window is showed 
in Figure 6.3.
Bellow the description text is a text area called Solution that contains the text 
describing how users can protect themselves against the attacks on the vulnerability 
described in the advisory. This text area can be often empty if the advisory describes 
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only the vulnerability itself. 
The label underneath this area called Credits typically shows the name of the 
person or the organization that has discovered the vulnerability.
Finally,  the  two  list  boxes  situated  at  the  bottom of  the  panel  show  the 
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Figure 6.2: The advisory details preview displayed on the  
right side of the Main tab of the VMT application.
Figure 6.3: The pop-up window displaying the description text of  
the advisory.
software products  affected  by  the  described  vulnerability and  the  references  to 
related  sources  of  information. Similar  to  the  text  areas,  the  list  boxes can  be 
vertically scrolled if the number of list items exceeds the size of the reserved area.
However, despite the possibility to scroll the content and display the pop-up 
window, the details preview might sometimes become uncomfortable to read. The 
user can in that case switch to the Detail tab in the top left corner of the application 
window. The information contained in this tab is the same as the information in the 
details preview, but it is presented in a much more readable form. The  description 
text is shown directly in its colored form and the user can also see the meaning of the 
individual colors on the right side of the window. 
Figure 6.4 shows the advisory from Figure 6.2 presented in the Detail tab.
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Figure 6.4: The left-hand side of the Detail tab of the VMT application.
Filtering Mechanisms
The main goal of the Vulnerability Management Tool application is to allow the user 
to filter the imported advisories and quickly retrieve the information he is interested 
in.  In order to satisfy this requirement,  the user is provided with several filtering 
mechanisms that  he  can  use to  specify his  search  criteria.  Most  of  them can be 
combined together in order to search for advisories that satisfy multiple criteria. The 
related  GUI  components  are  usually  displayed  with  a  check  box that  becomes 
selected when the user chooses a value for the particular component. The user can 
then simply deselect the check box to disable the related filtering mechanism.
Figure 6.5 shows one part of the filtering mechanisms that is situated to the 
left of the Search button.
The component  From date  and the component  To date  can be used to set 
restrictions on the release date of the result advisories. The user can write the date 
directly into the input field in format  dd.mm.yyyy or click on the icon on the right 
side of the input field and choose the date from the displayed calendar.
The  component  Full-text  search provides  means  to  search  the  advisories 
using various full-text methods provided by Lucene. The user can simply type in the 
keywords, and the underlying engine then searches for these words in the indexed 
text fields of the stored advisories. The indexed text fields are the advisory title field, 
the advisory summary field, the advisory solution field, and the advisory credits field.  
If the user separates the words by spaces, the engine retrieves results that contain any 
of the specified words. The user can use the word AND to indicate a conjunction or 
the word OR to write an explicit disjunction. The user can also use brackets '(' and ')' 
to write more complicated queries. It is also possible to write a name of a text field  
with  a colon to restrict the search to the specific field. The following example shows 
a query that can be used to search for advisories that contain the words  buffer and 
overflow in the title field, the word  dangerous in the summary field, and the word 
attack in any of the indexed text fields:
title:buffer AND title:overflow AND summary:dangerous AND attack
The user can additionally search for phrases using quotes. It is also possible 
to search for a word in a fuzzy way by appending the character '~' to the word. The 
user can also use the wildcard symbols '?'  and '*'  to mask particular parts of the 
words. For additional details about the query syntax, please refer to [LQPS11].
The following query shows a more advanced example of the syntax usage:
Figure 6.6: An example full-text query that can be passed to the VMT application.
(title:database AND oracle) OR (buf?er AND overflow~ AND 
summary:vulnerabilit*) OR credits:"Jeremy Brown" OR 
credits:m*security
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Figure 6.5: The first part of the VMT filtering mechanisms.
It might of course happen that the syntax of the query provided by the user is 
incorrect.  The  user  is  in  that  case  notified  by  a  red  label  that  shows  a  short  
description of the error below the progress-bar. 
If this filtering mechanism is used only by itself, the results are sorted by the 
calculated Lucene score with the best match at the top.
Figure  6.7  shows  the  second  part  of  the  filtering  mechanisms  which  is 
situated in the top right corner of the application window.
The  component  Source  allows  the  user  to  search  for  advisories  from  a 
particular source. The list of sources is automatically updated, so if the user imports 
advisories that come from a new source, the source becomes automatically included 
in the list.
The component  Category can be used to filter the advisories by their  CWE 
category. The list contains a category only if there is at least one advisory in the 
database that belongs to this category.
The  component  Product  allows  the  user  to  search  the  advisories  by  an 
affected product name. The underlying filtering mechanism implements some of the 
ideas related to affected products that were described in Section 4.3. The user can 
type in a product name, a vendor name, a product version, possibly other key strings. 
The engine then searches for these strings among the affected products stored in the 
database using the fuzzy search and the prefix search. The advisories that contain 
affected products which sufficiently match the input strings are then retrieved. There 
is also a prototype functionality which the user can enable by selecting the option 
Advanced  search  by  product.  This  functionality  can  be  used  only  by  itself  and 
therefore the other  filtering mechanisms become automatically disabled when the 
user  selects  this  option.  The  main  feature  of  this  functionality  is  that  the  result 
advisories are sorted by a score that is derived from the precision with which their 
affected products match the input query. Another feature is that the engine tries to 
recognize various short words as abbreviations and use their letters for the prefix 
search. This can cause, however, that many retrieved results are not truly related to 
what the user is interested in.
The  component  Reference can  be  used  to  search  by  references  to  other 
sources of information.  The underlying filtering mechanism is based on the ideas 
related to references that were described in Section 4.3. The engine searches for the 
user's input string among the references stored in the database using the wildcard 
search and retrieves the advisories that contain the matched references.
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Figure 6.7: The second part of the VMT filtering 
mechanisms
6.2  The Technical Background
Architecture
The architecture of the Vulnerability Management Tool is similar to the architecture 
of the Advisory Updaters application.  It  also makes use of dependency injection, 
which is in Java provided by the Spring framework  [SPRI11]. However, there are 
also two additional layers: 
• Data layer provides access to  the database and Lucene.  All  the insertion, 
update,  and  retrieval  functionality  is  provided  by this  layer.  The  layer  is 
implemented mostly using Hibernate, a framework for mapping the domain 
objects to the relational database [HIBE11]. Hibernate provides a convenient 
abstraction  which  allows  the  programmer  to  treat  the  data  stored  in  the 
database  in  a  similar  way  as  he  would  treat  standard  Java  objects. 
Additionally,  Hibernate  comes  with  an  extension  called  Hibernate  Search 
[HIDT11], which allows an integration of Hibernate with the Lucene library, 
giving it access to all the powerful full-text functionality that is provided by 
Lucene.
• Analysis  layer provides  the  interaction  with  GATE  and  performs  the 
classification  and  the  information  extraction.  All  the  necessary  GATE 
libraries are distributed with the application, so the target machine does no 
need to have GATE installed.
Figure 6.8 shows the dependencies among the layers.
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Figure  6.8:  The  dependencies  among  the  projects  of  the  
Vulnerability Management Tool application.
Choosing the Data Storage
A suitable  database  engine  is  often  the  backbone  of  a  data  oriented  application. 
Various types of database engines can serve various tasks and have various pros and 
cons. Because the application was going to be used for fast searching, the engine 
needed  to  have  an  indexing  support.  This  requirement  was  satisfied  by Lucene. 
However, it was also necessary to store various relations between the data, which led 
to  further exploration.  After a  consideration of object oriented databases,  such as 
MongoDB [MONG11], and various XML oriented databases, a decision was made to 
stick  with  a  traditional  relational  database.  Relational  databases  provide  a  very 
mature technology that  has  developed over  many years  and are among the most 
widely used database engines in the World. The final decision was to use HSQLDB 
[HSQL11],  which is  a  portable  SQL database engine.  Thanks to  this  choice,  the 
application can be simply copied to the target computer and does not require any 
kind of installation.
Data Import and Analysis
Before  implementing  the  data  import  and  the  data  analysis,  it  was  necessary  to 
design a database schema that would allow the data to be stored in the database in a 
coherent and structured form. The schema is shown in Figure 6.8.
Import
The first step of the application usage is typically the data import. The information 
gathered by the Advisory Updaters tool needs to be stored inside the database to 
allow  efficient  searching  and  filtering.  This  is  a  simple  task  in  case  of  simple 
advisory elements like the title or the release date. However, elements that are parts 
of lists, like references and affected products, need to be stored as separate objects. 
Because each advisory can have multiple references and affected products, and each 
reference or affected product can belong to multiple advisories, these relationships 
are of type M:N. Each imported advisory is represented by a new instance. However, 
this  does  not  count  for  the  references  and  affected  products.  Whenever  new 
references or affected products are to be inserted, it needs to be checked whether any 
of them already exists in the database. Those that are already present in the database 
are retrieved and accordingly mapped to the advisories. The others are first inserted 
into the database, and then mapped to the advisories as persistent objects.
To speed up the whole process, the references and affected products are first 
extracted from all the input advisories, while the mappings between advisories and 
their related elements are stored using hash tables. The elements can be then tested 
for their existence using a single "SELECT .. WHERE .. IN (.." query, rather than 
querying the database for each single element. The elements that are not among the 
results of the query are afterward inserted into the database. The hash tables are then 
used to map the elements in their persistent state back to the advisories.
Analysis
The analysis consists of classification, which assigns advisories to CWE categories, 
and  information  extraction,  which  assigns  annotations  to  advisories.  The 
functionality is primarily implemented using the GATE Embedded and makes use of 
the gazetteers, JAPE grammars, and machine learning models that were created as 
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the result of the analysis described in Chapter 4. 
The algorithm used for the classification task is the Support Vector Machine 
with a linear kernel, because it showed the best precision during the experiments. 
The information extraction is performed using only the machine learning approach to 
allow better demonstration of the underlying statistical model. 
6.3  Troubleshooting
The application can not be started or there are no advisories displayed
The most likely reason behind this issue is that the connection to the underlying data 
storage had not been correctly closed before the application was terminated.  This 
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Figure 6.8: The database schema of the VMT application. The schema does not  
display the tables required to maintain the M:N relationships.
typically happens when the application is terminated in a forced way, for example via 
the task manager. To solve this issue, please delete the file  vmt.db.lck under the 




Even when good programming practices are followed during the development of a 
software product, it happens many times for various reasons that the product contains 
a  vulnerable  spot  after  its  release.  Such  a  vulnerability  can  often  represent  a 
significant security threat if it is discovered and exploited by malicious subjects. It is 
therefore  important  that  these  vulnerabilities  are  identified  in  time  and  correctly 
reported to responsible persons. Despite the initiative to unify the format of these 
security  reports,  every  source  of  reports  publishes  its  articles  in  its  own unique 
format.  Additionally,  a  lot  of  information  is  usually  provided  in  a  form  of 
unstructured text, which is not directly suitable for automated processing.
We have studied various security standards and analyzed various sources of 
software security reports.  Using the acquired knowledge, we have implemented a 
tool  that  can  be  used  to  collect  reports  from various  sources  into  a  unified  and 
structured form. We have then studied several text mining techniques which could 
help  analyzing  the  reports  and  provide  means  for  their  filtering.  During  the 
subsequent analysis we have carried out the following tasks:
• The  reports  were  analyzed  by  human  observation  with  the  focus  on  the 
contained meta-data.
• The GATE text mining framework was used to apply some of the studied text 
mining  techniques  in  order  to  classify  the  reports  into  CWE  categories. 
Several methods were evaluated and compared during this task. The results 
were described in the last part of Section 4.4. 
• Several  methods  were  applied  in  the  endeavor  of  extracting  the  key 
information  from the  description  texts  of  the  reports.  This  task  was  also 
performed with the help of the GATE framework. The results were described 
in the last part Section 4.5.
Finally, we have implemented the Vulnerability Management Tool application 
that integrates various results of our analysis. The application provides a graphical 
interface that can be used by an average-experienced user to import, view, analyze, 
and filter the collected reports.
The main purpose of the presented thesis is to provide a proof of concept that 
certain automated analytical methods can be successfully applied to articles about 
software vulnerabilities in  order  to  reduce the amount  of  work required for their 
manual processing. In the following section we list several possible future directions.
7.2  Future Work
Because a significant part of the analysis has been performed using the description 
texts  of  the  reports,  it  is  very  likely  that  the  results  could  be  also  applied  to 
completely unstructured reports coming from various blogs and mailing-lists. When 
the reliability of the key information extraction reaches a sufficient level, it could be 
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used  to  extract  missing  meta-data,  or  provide  additional  means  of  filtering.  By 
adding various relationships to the ontology designed for the purposes of this thesis, 
it  should  be  possible  to  extract  even  more  information  from the  texts.  The  key 
information could be then used, for example, for generation of summaries. 
In  addition  to  the  implemented  filtering  mechanisms,  the  user  of  the 
Vulnerability Management Tool application could be also provided with an option to 
search for the documents that are related to a document of his choice. In that case, a 
possible approach could be to use document clustering described in Section 3.4 and 
then retrieve the whole cluster of similar documents.
Last but not least, it would be also possible to incorporate the user into the 
process of improving the performance of the application. A sufficiently qualified user 
could  occasionally  correct  potentially  incorrect  results  of  the  machine  learning 
processes, improving thus the underlying statistical models in an interactive fashion.
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12  Appendix A: CWE Categories
Appendix A describes the CWE categories identified in the advisories from NVD 
during the analysis  described in Section 4.4. The descriptions are taken from the 
CWE database.
CWE-119: Buffer Overflow
The software performs operations on a memory buffer, but it can read from or write 
to a memory location that is outside of the intended boundary of the buffer. 
CWE-134: Uncontrolled Format String
The  software  uses  externally-controlled  format  strings  in  printf-style  functions, 
which can lead to buffer overflows or data representation problems. 
CWE-16: Configuration
Weaknesses in this category are typically introduced during the configuration of the 
software. 
CWE-189: Numeric Errors
Weaknesses  in  this  category are related  to  improper  calculation or  conversion  of 
numbers. 
CWE-20: Improper Input Validation
The product does not validate or incorrectly validates input that can affect the control 
flow or data flow of a program. 
CWE-200: Information Exposure
An information exposure is the intentional or unintentional disclosure of information 
to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. 
CWE-22: Path Traversal
The software uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a 
file  or  directory  that  is  located  underneath  a  restricted  parent  directory,  but  the 
software does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can 
cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory. 
CWE-255: Credentials Management
Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of credentials. 
CWE-264: Access Controls
Weaknesses  in  this  category  are  related  to  the  management  of  permissions, 
privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control. 
CWE-287: Improper Authentication
When  an  actor  claims  to  have  a  given  identity,  the  software  does  not  prove  or 
insufficiently proves that the claim is correct. 
74
CWE-310: Cryptographic Issues
Weaknesses in this category are related to the use of cryptography. 
CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery
The web application does not, or can not, sufficiently verify whether a well-formed, 
valid, consistent request was intentionally provided by the user who submitted the 
request. 
CWE-362: Race Condition
The program contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and 
the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a 
timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code 
sequence that is operating concurrently. 
CWE-399: Resource Management Errors
Weaknesses  in  this  category  are  related  to  improper  management  of  system 
resources. 
CWE-59: Link Following
The software attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly 
prevent  that  filename  from  identifying  a  link  or  shortcut  that  resolves  to  an 
unintended resource. 
CWE-78: OS Command Injection
The software constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced 
input  from  an  upstream  component,  but  it  does  not  neutralize  or  incorrectly 
neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is 
sent to a downstream component. 
CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting
The software does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input 
before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users. 
CWE-89: SQL Injection
The software constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced 
input  from  an  upstream  component,  but  it  does  not  neutralize  or  incorrectly 
neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is 
sent to a downstream component. 
CWE-94: Code Injection
The software constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced 
input  from  an  upstream  component,  but  it  does  not  neutralize  or  incorrectly 
neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended 
code segment. 
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13  Appendix B: Stop Words
Appendix B contains the list of stop-words that was created for the purposes of the 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































14  Appendix C: Classification Configuration
Appendix C contains the configuration for the Support Vector Machine algorithm 
with a cubic kernel used for machine learning in the last experiment of the analysis 
described in Section 4.4.
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<ML-CONFIG>
  <VERBOSITY level="1"/>
  <SURROUND value="false"/>
  <IS-LABEL-UPDATABLE value="true"/>
  <IS-NLPFEATURELIST-UPDATABLE value="true"/>
  <PARAMETER name="thresholdProbabilityEntity" value="0.2"/>
  <PARAMETER name="thresholdProbabilityBoundary" value="0.42"/>
  <PARAMETER name="thresholdProbabilityClassification" value="0.8"/>
  <multiClassification2Binary method="one-vs-others" numberOfThreads="10"/>
  <EVALUATION method="split" runs="3" ratio="0.8"/>
  <FILTERING ratio="0.0" dis="near"/>
  
  <ENGINE nickname="SVM" implementationName="SVMLibSvmJava" 
options ="-t 1 -c 0.7 -tau 0.4"/>
  <DATASET>
    <INSTANCE-TYPE>Text</INSTANCE-TYPE>
    <NGRAM>
      <NAME>Keygram</NAME>
      <NUMBER>1</NUMBER>
      <CONSNUM>1</CONSNUM>
      <CONS-1>
        <TYPE>Token</TYPE>
        <FEATURE>string</FEATURE>
      </CONS-1>
    </NGRAM>
    <ATTRIBUTE>
      <NAME>Class</NAME>
      <SEMTYPE>NOMINAL</SEMTYPE>
      <TYPE>Text</TYPE>
      <FEATURE>class</FEATURE>
      <POSITION>0</POSITION>
      <CLASS/>
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Configuration
Appendix D contains the configuration for the Support Vector Machine algorithm 




  <SURROUND value="true"/>
  <FILTERING ratio="0.1" dis="near"/>
  <PARAMETER name="thresholdProbabilityEntity" value="0.2"/>
  <PARAMETER name="thresholdProbabilityBoundary" value="0.4"/>
  <PARAMETER name="thresholdProbabilityClassification" value="0.5"/>
  <multiClassification2Binary method="one-vs-others"/>
  <ENGINE nickname="SVM" implementationName="SVMLibSvmJava"
    options="-t 1 -c 0.7 -tau 0.4"/>
  <DATASET>
    <INSTANCE-TYPE>Token</INSTANCE-TYPE>
    <ATTRIBUTELIST>
      <NAME>Orthography</NAME>
      <SEMTYPE>NOMINAL</SEMTYPE>
      <TYPE>Token</TYPE>
      <FEATURE>orth</FEATURE>
      <RANGE from="-5" to="5"/>
    </ATTRIBUTELIST>
    <ATTRIBUTELIST>
      <NAME>POS</NAME>
      <SEMTYPE>NOMINAL</SEMTYPE>
      <TYPE>Token</TYPE>
      <FEATURE>category</FEATURE>
      <RANGE from="-5" to="5"/>
    </ATTRIBUTELIST>
    <ATTRIBUTELIST>
      <NAME>Morpho</NAME>
      <SEMTYPE>NOMINAL</SEMTYPE>
      <TYPE>Token</TYPE>
      <FEATURE>root</FEATURE>
      <RANGE from="-5" to="5"/>
    </ATTRIBUTELIST>
    <ATTRIBUTELIST>
      <NAME>TokenKind</NAME>
      <SEMTYPE>NOMINAL</SEMTYPE>
      <TYPE>Token</TYPE>
      <FEATURE>kind</FEATURE>
      <RANGE from="-5" to="5"/>
    </ATTRIBUTELIST>
79
    <ATTRIBUTE>
      <NAME>KeyInformation</NAME>
      <SEMTYPE>NOMINAL</SEMTYPE>
      <TYPE>Mention</TYPE>
      <FEATURE>class</FEATURE>
      <POSITION>0</POSITION>
      <CLASS/>
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Example
Appendix E demonstrates the process of information gathering described in Chapter 
5 on illustrative examples.
Figure E.1 shows an advisory presented on the Security Tracker website.
During the process of advisory update the Advisory Updaters tool extracts the 
information directly from the web page and transforms it into the common format. 
The result for this particular advisory looks as follows:
<Advisory>
  <Source>
    <SourceName>SecurityTracker</SourceName>
    <OriginalAdvID>1025617</OriginalAdvID>
    <Link>http://securitytracker.com/id/1025617</Link>
  </Source>
  <Title>Subversion mod_dav_svn Baselined WebDAV Request Processing Lets 
Remote Users Deny Service</Title>
  <ReleaseDate>2011-06-09</ReleaseDate>
  <Risk />
  <Summary>Access control error; Denial of service via network; A 
vulnerability was reported in Subversion. A remote user can cause denial of 
service conditions.A remote user can cause the target service to 
crash.</Summary>
  <Solution>The vendor has issued a fix (1.6.17).</Solution>
  <AffectedProducts>




Figure E.1: Security Tracker Advisory number 1025617
    <Reference Type="Web">http://subversion.apache.org/security/CVE-2011-1752-
advisory.txt</Reference>
    <Reference Type="CVE">CVE-2011-1752</Reference>
  </References>
  <Credits />
  <BaseCVSS>
    <AccessVector />
    <AccessComplexity />
    <Authentication />
    <ConfidentialityImpact />
    <IntegrityImpact />
    <AvailabilityImpact />
    <BaseScore>0</BaseScore>
  </BaseCVSS>
</Advisory>
Another  example  shows  an  advisory  from  the  National  Vulnerability 
Database in its XML form:
<entry id="CVE-2006-2439">
  <vuln:vulnerable-configuration id="http://nvd.nist.gov/">
    <cpe-lang:logical-test negate="false" operator="OR">
      <cpe-lang:fact-ref name="cpe:/a:zipcentral:zipcentral:4.01" />
    </cpe-lang:logical-test>
  </vuln:vulnerable-configuration>
  <vuln:vulnerable-software-list>








    <cvss:base_metrics>
      <cvss:score>7.6</cvss:score>
      <cvss:access-vector>NETWORK</cvss:access-vector>
      <cvss:access-complexity>HIGH</cvss:access-complexity>
      <cvss:authentication>NONE</cvss:authentication>
      <cvss:confidentiality-impact>COMPLETE</cvss:confidentiality-impact>
      <cvss:integrity-impact>COMPLETE</cvss:integrity-impact>
      <cvss:availability-impact>COMPLETE</cvss:availability-impact>
      <cvss:source>http://nvd.nist.gov</cvss:source>
      <cvss:generated-on-datetime>2006-06-01T12:55:00.000-
04:00</cvss:generated-on-datetime>
    </cvss:base_metrics>
  </vuln:cvss>
  <vuln:security-protection>ALLOWS_ADMIN_ACCESS</vuln:security-protection>
  <vuln:cwe id="CWE-119" />
  <vuln:references xml:lang="en" reference_type="UNKNOWN">
    <vuln:source>XF</vuln:source>
    <vuln:reference href="http://xforce.iss.net/xforce/xfdb/26737" 
xml:lang="en">zipcentral-zip-filename-bo(26737)</vuln:reference>
  </vuln:references>
  <vuln:references xml:lang="en" reference_type="VENDOR_ADVISORY">
    <vuln:source>VUPEN</vuln:source>




  <vuln:references xml:lang="en" reference_type="UNKNOWN">
    <vuln:source>BID</vuln:source>
    <vuln:reference href="http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/18160" 
xml:lang="en">18160</vuln:reference>
  </vuln:references>
  <vuln:references xml:lang="en" reference_type="UNKNOWN">
    <vuln:source>BUGTRAQ</vuln:source>
    <vuln:reference 
href="http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/archive/1/435416/100/0/threaded" 
xml:lang="en">20060531 Secunia Research: ZipCentral ZIP File Handling Buffer 
OverflowVulnerability</vuln:reference>
  </vuln:references>
  <vuln:references xml:lang="en" reference_type="UNKNOWN">
    <vuln:source>OSVDB</vuln:source>
    <vuln:reference href="http://www.osvdb.org/25830" 
xml:lang="en">25830</vuln:reference>
  </vuln:references>
  <vuln:references xml:lang="en" reference_type="UNKNOWN">
    <vuln:source>SECTRACK</vuln:source>
    <vuln:reference href="http://securitytracker.com/id?1016176" 
xml:lang="en">1016176</vuln:reference>
  </vuln:references>
  <vuln:references xml:lang="en" reference_type="VENDOR_ADVISORY">
    <vuln:source>MISC</vuln:source>




  <vuln:references xml:lang="en" reference_type="VENDOR_ADVISORY">
    <vuln:source>SECUNIA</vuln:source>
    <vuln:reference href="http://secunia.com/advisories/20179" 
xml:lang="en">20179</vuln:reference>
  </vuln:references>
  <vuln:summary>Stack-based buffer overflow in ZipCentral 4.01 allows remote 
user-assisted attackers to execute arbitrary code via a ZIP archive containing 
a long filename.</vuln:summary>
</entry>
The result of the transformation of this particular advisory into the common 
format looks as follows:
<Advisory>
  <Source>
    <SourceName>NVD</SourceName>
    <OriginalAdvID>CVE-2006-2439</OriginalAdvID>
    <Link>http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2006-2439</Link>
  </Source>
  <Title>Stack-based buffer overflow in ZipCentral 4.01 allows remote user-
assisted attackers to execute arb...</Title>
  <ReleaseDate>2011-07-28</ReleaseDate>
  <Risk>High</Risk>
  <Summary>Stack-based buffer overflow in ZipCentral 4.01 allows remote user-
assisted attackers to execute arbitrary code via a ZIP archive containing a 
long filename.</Summary>
  <Solution />
  <AffectedProducts>




    <Reference Type="Web">http://xforce.iss.net/xforce/xfdb/26737</Reference>
    <Reference 
Type="Web">http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2006/2049</Reference>
    <Reference Type="Web">http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/18160</Reference>
    <Reference 
Type="Web">http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/archive/1/435416/100/0/threa
ded</Reference>
    <Reference Type="Web">http://www.osvdb.org/25830</Reference>
    <Reference Type="Web">http://securitytracker.com/id?1016176</Reference>
    <Reference Type="Web">http://secunia.com/secunia_research/2006-
35/advisory/</Reference>
    <Reference Type="Web">http://secunia.com/advisories/20179</Reference>
    <Reference Type="CVE">CVE-2006-2439</Reference>
  </References>
  <Credits />
  <BaseCVSS>
    <AccessVector>NETWORK</AccessVector>
    <AccessComplexity>HIGH</AccessComplexity>
    <Authentication>NONE</Authentication>
    <ConfidentialityImpact>COMPLETE</ConfidentialityImpact>
    <IntegrityImpact>COMPLETE</IntegrityImpact>
    <AvailabilityImpact>COMPLETE</AvailabilityImpact>




17  Appendix F: Contents of the Enclosed CD
The  implementations  described  in  Chapter  5  and  Chapter  6  as  well  as  the 
configurations and resources created for the purposes of the analysis described in 
Chapter 4 can be found on the CD attached to the thesis. The content of the CD is  
organized as follows:
• analysis – The folder contains the GATE related configurations and resources 
that were created during the analysis described in Chapter 4. The content is 
divided into two sub-folders:
◦ classification  –  The  sub-folder  contains  the  resources related  to  the 
analysis described in Section 4.4.
◦ information_extraction – The sub-folder contains the resources related 
to the analysis described in Section 4.5.
• distribution  – The  folder  contains  the  distribution  of  the  Vulnerability 
Management Tool application described in Chapter 6. The distribution also 
includes the Advisory Updaters tool described in Chapter 5. The folder can be 
simply copied  to  a  hard-drive and the application can  be then started via 
VMT.jar.  The  Advisory  Updaters  tool  can  be  started  via 
UpdateAdvisories.bat.
• source_codes  – The  folder  contains  the  source  codes  of  the  applications 
implemented as part of this work. The content is divided into following sub-
folders:
◦ VMT – The Netbeans projects that form the Vulnerability Management 
Tool application. The projects were developed in NetBeans IDE 6.9.1.
◦ AdvisoryUpdaters  –  The Visual  Studio  Solution  of  the  Advisory 
Updaters application. The Solution was developed in Visual Studio 2010.
◦ ExtractCWE –  A small  C# application  that  extracts  description  texts 
together with CWE categories from NVD advisories. The application was 
developed in Visual Studio 2010.
• thesis – The folder contains the electronic version of this thesis.
• xml – The folder contains various XSLT transformations and XML schemata 
that were created as part of this work.  
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